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OPENING ADDRESS 
Brendan Whelan 
WELCOME 
 I would like to welcome you all to this our third Budget Perspectives Conference. The ESRI is delighted to be 
once again co-hosting the Conference with the Foundation for Fiscal Studies, an easy and fruitful 
collaboration since both organisations share the goals of careful analysis and relevance to policy. Of course, 
neither of the host bodies takes corporate or institutional views on the topics being discussed, so that the 
conclusions drawn in the papers are those of the individual authors themselves. 
The 2001 Budget is a very difficult one to frame and its provisions will be carefully scrutinised both 
within the country and, to a greater extent than in previous years, by analysts abroad.  Its objectives must 
include the balancing of a variety of conflicting aims, such as  
 
• To relieve various forms of congestion and infrastructural bottlenecks without adding excessively 
to aggregate demand and fuelling inflation; 
• To maintain unemployment as low as possible, while curbing unwarranted wage rises in sectors 
and occupations suffering from labour scarcity; 
• To improve state services and overall equity while keeping demand pressures under control; 
• To maintain or improve overall competitiveness without reducing living standards. 
Squaring circles such as these will require well worked out and sometimes controversial decisions. We 
hope that the Conference papers will help to inform these choices, and to make clear some of their longer 
term consequences. 
 
 The first paper by Ide Kearney, Daniel McCoy, David Duffy, Michael McMahon and 
Diarmaid Smyth takes a detailed look at the assessment of fiscal stance in Irish budgets. 
This refers to the overall impact of the budget – is it expansionary or contractionary, taking 
account of the state of the public finances, the stage of the economic cycle and the growth 
prospects for the economy. The authors conclude that budgetary policy has in general been pro-cyclical in 
the period 1977 to 1986, counter-cyclical, and contractionary, in the years 1987 to 1993 and mainly pro-
cyclical since 1994. The authors feel that the strategy to be recommended for the 2001 budget depends on 
one's view of the current boom.   If it is seen as the peak of conventional economic cycle, then a 
deflationary stance is called for.  If, alternatively, the economy is thought to be in an exceptional phase as it 
moves to a higher growth path, then increasing productive capacity through an expansionary budget is the 
top priority. Reflecting the tension between these views, they recommend a moderately expansionary 
structural budget but one which incorporates a postponement of the promised tax cuts to the later stages 
of the PPF agreement. 
 
 This year we are delighted to welcome a distinguished speaker from outside Ireland. 
Professor Ray Barrell is based at the National Institute for Economic and Social Research 
in London and is a noted expert on the UK and international economies. The unusual 
extent to which the Irish economy is now open to world trade flows is often not appreciated: our exports 
alone are approximately equal in value to total GNP. Hence, developments on the international scene are 
of vital concern in framing an Irish budget. Ray's paper contrasts the situation in the United States, where 
sustained strong growth and low inflation indicate benign structural shifts in the economy, with the 
A 
Macroeconomic 
Perspective  
The International 
Picture 
European economies where recent improvements appear more cyclical in character.   These differences 
have important implications for future developments in the euro zone and for policy to deal with them. 
 
 Jim Walsh of the Combat Poverty Agency and Michael Plumb, formerly of the ESRI and 
now in Sydney University, take a detailed look at an important policy area – methods for 
the provision of child income support. They suggest that policy in this area, which is 
significant in terms of the resources devoted to it, lacks coherence. They set out the main schemes which 
provide income support for children and discuss the policy objectives. Having compared the Irish situation 
with that in the UK, they outline a strategy for systematic reform of the Irish policies. Their paper 
concludes by using the ESRI's SWITCH model to evaluate the effects of implementing this strategy, on the 
basis of a substantial increase in the funding devoted to child income support. Despite the size of the 
increase, the reform examined was shown to have some defects, such as poor targeting towards 
households at the bottom end of the income distribution, as well as clear benefits.  The paper illustrates the 
scale of resources needed to have significant effects on child poverty and emphasises the value of model-
based simulations in studying the effects of policies with complex results. 
 
 Edgar Morgenroth utilises the economic literature on "fiscal federalism" to examine the 
structure of the various levels of regional government in Ireland.  He identifies the 
functions which can be performed by the different levels of government and how these functions can be 
optimally allocated across the various tiers of administration.  The paper then sets out the different layers 
of government and concludes that the functions of the regional assemblies and regional authorities do not 
conform with those suggested by economic theory.  It is suggested that these levels be abolished or have 
their functions enhanced. A variety of possible functions that could be further decentralised are then 
discussed and some re-balancing of responsibilities among levels of government suggested. 
 
 The papers raise a host of important issues, at both the macro and micro levels. This 
year, we have left a longer period at the end of the morning for a panel discussion and for 
participation from the audience. Please use it fully. 
 
Child Income 
Support 
Regional Issues 
Final Comment 
1 
INTRODUCTION 
Brendan Whelan 
 Ireland has traditionally enjoyed a relatively unpolluted environment. This 
was not due to any marked national proclivity to value and protect the 
natural world, but rather to low population density and the modest pace of 
economic growth over many decades. Economic development, and 
particularly its recent acceleration, has put our environment under 
increased stress. Deterioration in its overall quality is evident to the casual 
observer and is well-documented in scientific reports. To reverse this 
decline, a strong national commitment to sustainable development is vital. 
Protecting the environment has great national benefits, including the health 
and enjoyment derived by Irish residents, the benefits to our important 
tourism industry, the fulfilment of national obligations under EU and UN 
agreements and our general obligations to posterity. The ESRI report on 
National Investment Priorities1 emphasises the importance of social and 
recreational capital in attracting and retaining a skilled, internationally 
mobile workforce. A high quality natural environment can be a critical 
component of this capital stock. 
What can economics say about the conservation and protection of the 
environment? It is evident that economic activity can involve considerable 
negative externalities such as air and water pollution, congestion and 
reductions in bio-diversity. For more than a century, economists have 
known that the unfettered operation of the market has great difficulty in 
preventing such problems. After much conceptual and empirical analysis, a 
widely-shared consensus has emerged about how the undesirable effects of 
such externalities can best be reduced or eliminated. The key requirement 
is, essentially, that taxes and regulations embody the “polluter pays” 
principle. Properly implemented, this rule can guarantee that (the full range 
of) marginal social costs are brought into balance with marginal social 
benefits and that overall social well-being is optimised. In Ireland as 
elsewhere there has been no shortage of suggestions for appropriate 
economic instruments and market-based policies such as eco-taxes on 
pollution, subsidies for environmentally beneficial activities and tradable 
permits to limit deleterious effects on natural systems. 
And yet the results in terms of achieved environmental benefits have 
been deeply disappointing. Few of the suggested instruments have been 
introduced and those that have are often implemented in a limited and 
 
1 Fitz Gerald, J , I  Kearney, E  Morgenroth and D  Smyth (eds ), 1999  National Investment 
Priorities for the Period 2000-2006. Policy Research Series No  33, Dublin: The Economic and 
Social Research Institute   
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ineffectual manner. The reasons for this failure are the focus of this 
volume. As the reader will see, a wide variety of explanations can be 
advanced for the failure to introduce effective market-based instruments 
including public misperceptions, inertia, the pressure from small groups of 
well-organised opponents and faults in the design of the suggested 
schemes. The authors make clear that progress will require action across a 
broad front and must involve a variety of skills and disciplines in addition 
to economics, such as engineering, law and political science. I believe that 
market-based instruments have a lot to contribute towards conserving 
Ireland's environment and I hope this publication will clarify how they can 
be better designed and more widely implemented.   
 
3 
OVERVIEW 
Sue Scott and Daniel McCoy 
 While concern for the natural environment continues to be widely 
professed, it is often unmatched by a willingness to take action. Green 
intentions are discouraged by the burdens that effective policies would 
impose. But are these burdens real or imagined, or necessarily either? If 
there are better ways to take action, why are they not taken? This volume 
addresses the challenge, as perceived, to “green and bear it”. 
Economists are wary of interfering with markets though an exception 
exists when private and social costs and benefits diverge. Such a 
divergence leads to misallocation and excessive pollution under a laissez 
faire policy, and instead warrants intervention by the state by means of 
market-based instruments. Market-based instruments (MBIs) include a 
number of measures, such as eco-taxes, charges on use of resources, 
tradable pollution permits, putting biodiversity tasks out to tender, deposit-
refund schemes, subsidies and selective tax reductions – policies that are 
effective and quite widely applied in other places.2 Such policies can 
increase the gain and ease the pain of environmental protection. 
The contributors to this volume are at the forefront of research into 
MBIs and they support their introduction in the right circumstances. 
Contributors from abroad include leading international exponent David 
Pearce of University College London, whose seminal textbook on 
environmental economics is well known to students and whose Blueprint for 
a Green Economy set “a powerful new agenda” that is beginning to bear fruit. 
Christian Averous and Heino von Meyer are with the Organisation for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the agency that has 
given worldwide exposure to use of economic instruments for dealing with 
environmental problems. The OECD published its classic paper, The 
Polluter Pays Principle, in 1975 and has been backing it up with a vigorous 
programme of environmental research in the meantime.  
From Ireland the contributors to this volume include Frank Convery 
of the Department of Environmental Studies at University College Dublin 
and John Fitz Gerald, Daniel McCoy, Jonathan Hore, Sue Scott and John 
Eakins of the Economic and Social Research Institute. The environmental 
research of these authors has been published widely, in domestic and 
 
2 As described by: OECD, 1999, Economic instruments for pollution control and natural resources 
management in OECD Countries: A survey, Paris: OECD and by: Barrett, A  and J  Lawlor and S  
Scott, 1997, The fiscal system and the polluter pays principle – A case study of Ireland, Ashgate, Aldershot   
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international journals and books, as well as by agencies such as the World 
Bank and the European Commission. 
Ireland faces environmental problems that are challenging enough 
without foregoing the efficiency to be gained from using market-based 
policies. Such policies operate through incentives and disincentives, which 
are quite distorting as they stand. The reason why policies that use MBIs 
are efficient, when correctly implemented, is that they allow discretion as 
to the extent and timing of actions that protect the environment with the 
result that environmental protection is undertaken by those who can do so 
at least cost. (There are obvious exceptions such as those involving 
hazardous substances.) Resulting environmental improvements tend to be 
systemic and achieved at lowest cost to society. Although results may be 
slower to materialise than if policies of a regulatory nature are 
implemented, the development of correct technology is stimulated, and 
long run improvements are  automatically encouraged. 
Despite their advantages, Ireland has largely avoided adopting MBIs 
to-date, despite a decade of high-profile work describing their potential. 
The conclusion to be drawn is that such market-based policies are difficult 
to introduce. With the announcement that carbon taxes will be employed 
as part of the National Climate Change Strategy, such policies are likely to be 
more widely discussed from now on. The papers presented here, delivered 
to the conference Green and bear it?, pursued the questions: why are market-
based policies difficult to introduce? What are the implementation issues 
that objectors fear or cite as obstacles? How have other countries 
overcome such objections and what might help us to understand what is 
needed to alleviate any pain and assuage fears that we would simply have 
to bear it?  
 
David Pearce states that the UK has made significant advances in the 
adoption of MBIs for environmental policy but that the last few years have 
also seen some setbacks. From his close observation of the issues at play 
he classifies the difficulties as: (a) the legacy of legislative history which 
pre-empts discretion (b) the threat that market-based instruments pose to 
supporters of the status-quo, (c) inconsistent government goals and 
legislation, (d) “picture thinking” about economics which is deeply 
ingrained in the public's and media's minds, (e) media obsession with 
losers, not winners, and, ultimately, (f) politicians' unwillingness to present 
the environmental case in a context where, whatever the rhetoric, the 
environment is simply not a dominant political priority. The decision to 
end the Fuel Duty Escalator has to be seen as a severe blow to a transport 
strategy that should switch passengers from road to rail, to a rational 
energy policy, and to the future of an economics-based environmental 
policy. Nonetheless, in many senses, the UK is a world leader in terms of 
introducing MBIs to ever widening areas of policy. 
 
Christian Averous and Heino von Meyer provide an overview of key 
findings concerning the use of economic instruments in environmental 
policies aimed at environmental pollution control, natural resource 
management and sustainable development. They summarise the main 
conclusions from the first cycle of OECD environmental performance 
reviews, which covered all OECD member countries and a few non-
   OVERIVIEW 5 
member countries. The Environmental Performance Review of Ireland was 
published in 2000. Here they focus on two examples of economic 
instruments that are of particular relevance to Ireland and have been 
studied in the most recent reviews: green tax reform in Germany and 
tradable fishing permits in Iceland. The paper draws on wide-ranging basic 
analytical work supporting the use of MBIs, undertaken by the OECD 
Environment Directorate. 
 
John Fitz Gerald, Daniel McCoy and Jonathan Hore consider the 
magnitude of the problem facing Ireland in reaching the target set under 
the Kyoto protocol for greenhouse gas emissions and the likely policy 
instruments available to achieve it in an efficient manner. The 
distributional impacts of the policies under consideration are outlined. The 
main conclusion of this paper is that participation in an international 
emissions trading programme would be an efficient means of reducing 
emissions in Ireland. Such an international scheme should apply only to 
importers or producers of primary energy. However, special provision 
would be needed for sectors that are both very energy intensive and face 
serious international competition. It is important that the tradable permits be 
sold rather than given away so that the revenue can be used to reduce other 
distortions and to ensure that poor households are compensated for any 
losses. 
 
Sue Scott and John Eakins address the widespread concern that market-
based policies would hurt the less well-off and the perception that they are 
simply additional taxes. Such concern usually overlooks the potential for 
re-spending the revenues and may account for the low level of adoption of 
such policies, despite their ability to reduce the overall costs of 
environmental protection. Discussion in the paper centres on three 
examples of market-based policies, namely, (1) carbon taxes, (2) charges 
for refuse and (3) metered charges for domestic water services, all based 
ideally on the quantity of pollution or resource use. In deciding how to re-
spend the new revenues, governments have a choice of objectives. On the 
one hand they can concentrate re-spending on reducing distorting taxes; 
on the other hand they can alleviate the regressive effects – to such an 
extent if wished that the result can actually be progressive; or there can be 
various combinations of the two approaches. It is shown how a 
progressive outcome could be achieved, even with domestic water charges, 
investigated here for the first time and with proposed compensation based 
on household size. 
 
Frank Convery suggests factors and associated indicators that might 
explain the mobilisation or otherwise of environmental taxation as a 
substantial policy instrument. These cover a multitude of possible 
explanations including: governments not being in need of the money, lack 
of economists in public administration, lack of “champions” to provide 
leadership in government departments, the perception that environmental 
effectiveness is negligible or ambiguous, concerns about damage to 
competitiveness, populist culture against “charges”, and availability of 
funds for investment from elsewhere. Some of these are merely plausible 
hypotheses for which limited or no evidence was adduced, while in other 
6 GREEN AND BEAR IT 
cases, there is some research to support the case made. At present, Irish 
circumstances do seem largely to conform to the hypothesised factors that 
could inhibit the use of market forces to support environmental policy.  
  
7 
1. WHAT HAVE WE 
LEARNED FROM THE UK’S 
EXPERIENCE WITH 
MARKET-BASED 
INSTRUMENTS? 
David Pearce3 
 With some exceptions,4 economists tend to be forceful advocates of the 
introduction of market-based approaches to environmental policy. It is not 
always clear what distinguishes market-based approaches from other 
policies. Market-based instruments (MBIs) tend to be targeted directly on 
the input and output prices that face households and corporations, 
whereas more traditional forms of regulation are quantity – or technology-
based, with prices responding rather than leading the resulting behavioural 
change. For others, MBIs are contrasted with “command and control” 
(CAC) regulations which tell polluters what to do and how to do it. On this 
definition, MBIs have the important characteristic of leaving the polluter 
with the maximum flexibility to respond to a given target. It is this 
flexibility that generates the alleged advantages of MBIs: lower regulatory 
compliance costs and the continuing stimulus to go beyond stated targets 
by stimulating abatement technology (“overcompliance”).  
These advantages of MBIs should translate into potential strategic 
political gains. Minimised compliance costs reduce the chances that 
polluter lobbies will resist future environmental regulations because of cost 
concerns. The polluters are “bought in” to regulation. Minimised costs 
should also serve equity goals: a lower total cost is being distributed across 
losers compared to the higher cost option. For MBIs such as taxes, charges 
and auctioned permits, there are revenues which can either be added to 
other tax revenues, or recycled to reduce other distorting taxes and to 
support environmental good causes, thus gaining political popularity. And 
there should be less chance of regulatory capture by polluters and 
 
3 Department of Economics and CSERGE, University College London  
4 For an excellent sceptical essay, see Russell and Powell (1996)  
1.1 
The Issue: If 
MBIs Are So 
Smart, Why Are 
They So 
Difficult to 
Introduce? 
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intermediate agencies, thus improving the effectiveness of environmental 
policy. 
But if MBIs are so theoretically sound, so environmentally effective, 
so good for business and households, and so attractive politically, why 
have they not made more progress in both rich and poor countries? Why is 
it that environmental taxes account for only between 4 and 11 per cent of 
total tax revenues in OECD countries (OECD, 1999), and only 9 per cent 
in Ireland and 8 per cent in the UK? It cannot be their newness: the 
OECD, for example, has advocated MBIs for three decades. It has to be 
something to do with the way they are perceived and the institutional 
context into which they have to be introduced. In this paper we suggest a 
number of obstacles to the introduction and expansion of MBIs. In doing 
so we draw on the experience of the United Kingdom. This is an 
experience that is both encouraging and discouraging. It is encouraging 
because the UK has shown remarkable ingenuity in introducing MBIs in 
quite a few sectors, but especially in energy, transport and waste. It is 
discouraging because its efforts in other sectors, notably agriculture, have 
not succeeded, and because the last few years have witnessed very serious 
setbacks for MBIs in the transport sector. Yet, arguably, any government 
that fails to tackle the environmental problems created by transport and 
agriculture has failed to deal with the most seriously polluting and 
environmentally destructive sectors of all.  
The analysis in this paper is necessarily brief. Far more detail can be 
found in Pearce (2001) and Pearce and Helm (forthcoming). We argue that 
the obstacles to environmental policy reform based on MBIs are many, but 
that the main ones are: 
(a) the legacy of legislative history,  
(b) the threat that MBIs pose for regulatory capture,  
(c) inconsistent government goals and legislation,  
(d) “picture thinking” about economics which is deeply engrained in 
the public’s and media’s minds,  
(e) media obsession with losers, not winners, and, ultimately, (f) 
politicians’ unwillingness to present the environmental case in a 
context where, whatever the rhetoric, the environment is simply not a 
dominant political priority. 
 
 In the UK, like most advanced economies, environmental policy has a 
long history of being based on “best” technology (Pearce, 2000). Since at 
least the 1874 Amendment to the Alkali Act of 1863, polluters of air have 
been required to adopt “best practicable means“ (BPM) and, later “best 
available technology” (BAT). The process was based on what technology 
was available, not on what a desirable emission level was. So long as clean 
technologies did not impose “unreasonable” cost on industry – the 
significance of “practicable” in BPM and “available” in BAT, later 
strengthened with “not entailing excessive cost” (BATNEEC) – they were 
the ones to be chosen. Moreover, BPM, BAT or BATNEEC were to be 
applied at plant level, i.e. to each emitting source.  
It was well over one hundred years before any attempt was made to 
change the traditional approach to environmental policy. Building on 
internal civil service pressure, and on its own commissioned report, the 
1.2 
History Matters 
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“Pearce Report”, subsequently to become Blueprint for a Green Economy 
(Pearce et al., 1989), the then Conservative Government signalled a major 
change in policy. Its 1990 White Paper This Common Inheritance (UK 
Government, 1990) may, in retrospect, appear a tame advance – like many 
government announcements of new measures, substantial “spin” was 
placed on repackaging what already existed or what was planned anyway – 
it nonetheless heralded a change of direction. It declared that: 
In the Government’s view, market mechanisms offer the 
prospect of a more efficient and flexible response to 
environmental issues, both old and new (para 1.29). 
Most bravely of all, This Common Inheritance flirted with a carbon tax to 
assist in the control of global warming. Recall that this was a full two years 
before the Rio “Earth Summit” of 1992 at which the Framework 
Convention on Climate Change was agreed. Within government there had 
been extensive discussion about carbon taxes, to the general exclusion of 
most other means of securing carbon emission targets when they were 
agreed. In the event, the discussion in This Common Inheritance had to be 
muted because the privatisation of the electricity industry was imminent. A 
clear statement that there would be carbon taxes could have led to vast 
sums being wiped off the flotation price for an industry then heavily 
dependent on coal, and even to legal action.  
While the 1990 White Paper marked the beginning of a change in 
policy, the fact of a century or more of technology-based standards 
automatically limited, and continues to limit, the extent of change. If each 
plant is achieving the maximum “end of pipe technology” feasible amount 
of pollution reduction, any additional tax will not result in further 
environmental gains unless polluters have the freedom to choose other 
ways of reducing pollution. Instead, so long as the tax is payable on all 
emissions, firms will be paying taxes on emissions over which they 
(technologically speaking) have no control. If the focus is on tradable 
permits, whereby firms can buy and sell the rights to emit pollutants, a 
different problem arises. Trading can only take place if those who find it 
easiest to abate pollution do so and collect credits which they can then sell 
to those who find it most difficult to abate pollution. The levels of 
abatement will therefore differ between firms. But if all firms’ plants are 
already at their technological maximum in terms of clean technology, and 
are obliged to stay there because of BAT-type regulations, there will be no 
room for trading. This concern has already been voiced in the context of 
carbon-trading in the UK.  
In practice, there is likely to be some room for manoeuvre. European 
Integrated Pollution Prevention and Control (IPPC) procedures appear to 
be more loosely defined and encompass wider control options than just 
“end of pipe technology”. There may also be scope for “bunching” plants 
together so that trading can take place between them provided the overall 
ceiling on emissions is honoured. While there do appear to be ways of 
extending the scope of market-based instruments (MBIs) such as taxes and 
permits, it is nonetheless the case that the scope of  MBIs is limited by the 
history of environmental policy, a history that has not been changed by the 
advent of MBIs. 
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Section 1.2 suggested that the very history of environmental policy in the 
UK is an obstacle to change. But, governments have a history of repealing 
past legislation in other areas of policy: why not in the environmental 
context? While it may seem politically simple to repeal one Act and replace 
it with another, in practice legislation acquires supporters who derive 
comfort from its existence. The process of “regulatory capture”, whereby 
those who are regulated spend resources influencing the regulator, 
softening the process and determining the way regulation is interpreted, 
means that whatever legislation exists has a political constituency that is 
not easy to change. The regulators themselves may also see no purpose in 
change – they have been selected to implement the existing legislation and 
may well lack the expertise, vision or will to change it, especially if what is 
new threatens their own livelihoods. 
A case study helps illustrate the problems. In an excellent paper, 
Sorrell (1999) analyses the reasons for the failure to introduce tradable 
sulphur dioxide permits in the UK. Some of the reasons can be regarded as 
“exogenous”, i.e. relating to factors that were not part of environmental 
policy. Thus, there were developments in energy markets which resulted in 
a switch to low sulphur fuels, reducing the need for controls on sulphur 
emissions. But there were also conflicts of regulatory principles – trading 
simply did not fit with Integrated Pollution Control (IPC) which was still 
based on the BATNEEC philosophy which focuses on emission limits at 
individual emission sources. BATNEEC leaves no room for trading since 
every source is constrained to its “BAT” solution. To be effective in terms 
of cost savings, trading implies a relaxation of BATNEEC.  
In terms of regulatory capture, Sorrell notes conflicts of regulatory 
culture. There was (and is) a tight knit “policy community” that is largely 
responsible for the implementation of policy. This community – basically 
operators and inspectors and excluding the public, central government and 
environmental groups – has a belief system into which MBIs simply do not 
fit. Tradable permits were not initiated by this community, nor would they 
have been since they would reduce the discretionary power residing in that 
community. Sorrell also argues that there was limited political backing for 
tradable permits. Support came from the then Department of the 
Environment but not from other ministries and certainly not the 
regulators. Even if the “exogenous” factors had not been present, Sorrell 
doubts that tradable sulphur permits would have been introduced.  
Since this story was told, some things have changed. The policy 
community has, to some extent, begun to fray at the edges. Significantly, it 
is industry rather than government, which has played an enabling role only, 
that has initiated permit trading schemes for carbon – for example British 
Petroleum’s internal trading scheme. In June 1999 the Emissions Trading 
Group (ETG) was formed, comprising some 40 UK companies plus 
government representatives. The ETG proposals were published in late 
October 1999 (ETG, 1999). One important provision, stressed in the ETG 
document (para 7.6 and Annex 9), is that industry expects government to 
ensure that participants are deemed to have met IPPC energy efficiency 
requirements without the need for site-by-site BAT standards being met. 
The ETG paper indicates that without this agreement, trading would 
probably be unworkable (Annex 9).  
1.3 
Regulatory 
Capture 
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A second difference from the sulphur trading policy is that there is 
wider cross-department support in government for trading initiatives, 
although inter-departmental rivalry remains in that the Department of the 
Environment, Transport and Regions still competes with the Department 
of Trade and Industry and others, such as the Ministry of Agriculture with 
essential sectoral interests at heart.  
But other features present at the time of the failed sulphur trading 
exercise are still present. The Environment Agency (EA), formed in 1996 
from local authority waste management authorities, the National Rivers 
Authority and Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Pollution, is responsible for 
the implementation of environmental policy. Yet it still has barely a 
handful of economists out of some 10,000 employees. Even this small 
number of economists has shown only limited signs of wishing to engage 
the Agency on economic approaches to environmental policy. Nor is it 
clear that any initiatives among the economists will filter upwards to the 
top executives in the EA, none of whom, in any event, has an economics 
background – a characteristic that extends to the Board of the EA itself. 
As Helm (2000) notes: 
The Environment Agency’s reluctance to embrace CBA [cost 
benefit analysis] and economic instruments is not an accident. It 
reflects the incentives of the Environment Agency’s 
management and employees. Scientists and engineers are 
unlikely to welcome the idea that pollution licences should be 
subject to detailed scrutiny of costs and benefits, and that 
economic valuations might help to determine the optimum level 
of pollution. Many current activities and decisions might be 
consequentially questioned. More threatening still are economic 
instruments, since their application removes much of the role of 
the experts in fixing and revising regulation, and would make the 
activities of some employees redundant (p. 26). 
It would seem that the same lengthy history of traditional control that 
makes MBIs difficult to introduce, has also vested power in those who 
have the least understanding of MBIs and the least incentive to embrace 
them.   
 
 Contrary to the widespread textbook assumption that governments 
maximise some well-ordered social welfare function – amusingly 
characterised in the UK Labour Government’s slogan of “joined-up 
government” – all regulatory regimes have an in-built tendency to adopt 
political objectives that are inconsistent. This is obvious once it is 
recognised that government is about compromise between lobbies that 
have often wholly divergent goals: environmental improvement versus 
international competitiveness, and protecting the vulnerable versus 
economic efficiency, for example. 
Specific instances abound. The UK Government gave, albeit 
temporary, aid to the coal industry by preventing privatised electricity 
generators from adopting gas-fired stations, a policy that was inconsistent 
with Kyoto goals and which has since been rescinded. The domestic sector 
has been systematically ring-fenced from the design of energy taxes – e.g. 
the Climate Change Levy (CCL) and full VAT on energy (where it would 
1.4  
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have come into conflict with fuel poverty goals and with the policy of 
reducing prices).5 The CCL is also not a carbon tax, precisely because, if it 
had been, it would have worked to the detriment of the coal industry. The 
price regulation system for utilities is also confusing with respect to 
environmental factors, some regulators arguing that it is not their duty to 
reflect environmental concerns in pricing formulae. The wider notion of 
competition and liberalisation of energy markets is not consistent with 
environmental goals, the former lowering prices, the latter requiring higher 
prices. Under the Utilities Act, the regulator OFGEM is instructed to 
promulgate the defence of the consumer first, and social and 
environmental responsibilities are secondary goals, with no guidance on 
what to do if they conflict, as they will. After a succession of  water 
shortages in England, it is also odd to find legislation that makes the 
installation of water meters in households a voluntary matter, as if wastage 
of water confers no externalities on other users.  
Helm (2000) sums it up well: 
As long as objectives are not clearly spelt out, along with the 
painful trade-offs, the scope for policy opportunism and policy 
confusion remains considerable. The temptation to pick and 
choose among the components of sustainable development has 
proved irresistible, leaving voters confused as between the 
motives of revenue raising and general taxation, social/equity 
objectives and environmental protection. That, in turn, reduces 
their credibility. (p. 4). 
The image of “joined up” government is that multiple political goals 
are consistent when they need not be. More clarity is needed on the trade-
off between goals, e.g. what environmental benefits are being sacrificed by 
making environmental policy less efficient than it could be.  
Policy confusion also arises in the context of subsidies. It is difficult 
to see how much progress can be made on MBIs whilst significant sectors 
of economic activity are the subject of subsidies. Some subsidies remain in 
the energy sector, but the largest subsidies are to agriculture. The sheer 
scale of agricultural subsidies, over £3 billion in the UK, or some £140 per 
household per year, and the vocal nature of the lobbies mean that “subsidy 
culture” is deeply embedded and difficult to move. Farmers all too often 
speak as if they have a right to subsidy, a view that is re-expressed as a 
requirement for compensation whenever market or other conditions work 
to their disadvantage. Governments simply add to the image of 
inconsistency by surrendering to these demands, the only hopeful signs 
being the recent suggestions that, after a succession of crises, there has to 
be a fundamental rethink about the future of the agricultural sector in the 
UK. But it has been said before, and those who say it may never have had 
the experience of trying to implement it. 
 
 
 
5 Yet, ultimately, households will pay a significant share of the costs because of the ability of 
industry to pass on cost increases, so that full protection of the domestic sector is an illusion  
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It is easy to identify the lobbies against MBIs, but who argues for them? 
The role of public information and countervailing pressures is weak in the 
UK. Some NGOs appear unsupportive, especially of tradable permits. This 
contrasts with the USA. Academic voices and some think tanks in the UK 
favour MBIs but do not act in a concerted fashion as they do in the USA, 
as the examples of Resources for the Future and the American Enterprise 
Institute show. More and better public information on pollution trends and 
hazards is needed. Policy oriented academic research is still limited and 
should be encouraged over more abstract concerns. 
A number of countries have also had positive experiences with so-
called Green Tax Commissions. Such expert groups have been able to 
positively contribute to arguments about the efficient design of policy. 
Taking this concept one step further would mean turning such 
commissions into more inclusive bodies by widening membership to all 
relevant stakeholders or their representatives. It could, perhaps, have been 
part of the UK’s new Commission for Sustainable Development (CSD), 
but, regrettably, the CSD membership lists no economics expertise at all! It 
is therefore likely to be as ineffective as previous ventures such as the 
“Round Table” on Sustainable Development. Nor is it likely that this 
economic castration of the CSD is accidental. The UK Treasury has no 
interest in any independent body discussing tax affairs which it sees as 
exclusively its own concern.  
 
 Much of the debate about the virtues and problems of MBIs takes place 
in contexts where adversaries use different “rules of the game”. The issue 
that most often gives rise to seemingly unresolvable debate is what we will 
call the “baseline issue”. The baseline can be defined in terms of what 
would happen if a given policy instrument is not adopted. If the parties to 
the debate have different assumptions about what the baseline is, then it is 
hardly surprising that they will have different views about the desirability 
of a given regulatory instrument.  
Consider an hypothetical tax on pesticides, one of the MBIs that the 
UK Government planned to introduce but which it has had to shelve. The 
alternatives to the tax are (a) no change at all in the status quo, i.e. no tax but 
no alternative regulation either; and (b) some alternative regulation. Each 
stakeholder will measure or judge their position with the tax (as they 
perceive it) relative to the baseline they assume. Farmers or the pesticides 
industry might, for example, assume that the alternative to the tax is no 
regulatory action at all. Regulators might assume that if there is no tax, 
there will have to be quantity restrictions, perhaps including bans on some 
pesticides. For the “losers” the loss is measured as the cost to them of the 
tax. Since this could be significant, farmers and industry may combine to 
lobby against the tax. For the regulator, the benefit is the environmental 
and health gains from pesticide reduction due to the tax compared to the 
gains from the quantity control. The outcome is one set of losers and one 
set of gainers. If, instead, the losers calculated the costs as the losses from 
the tax minus the losses from the alternative regulation they would 
otherwise have to tolerate, it is possible to get a very different outcome 
since both regulators may gain (they secure the policy goals) and farmers 
and industry may gain. The outcome is gain for all parties. 
1.5 
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The illustration is of crucial importance since it shows how the 
framing of policy decisions can seriously affect the chances of securing 
adoption of the policy. Of course, what happens in practice is that those 
opposed to the tax are likely actively to seek to make sure that the baseline 
is the one they favour. In other words, they campaign against the tax but 
also, implicitly, against any form of incremental regulation. Manipulating 
the baseline is important in the context of MBIs because, if they are less 
expensive in terms of compliance than some “command and control” 
alternative, MBIs can be presented by regulators as the cheapest option, 
which should encourage acceptance of them as the appropriate measure. 
But this strategy will fail if either polluters believe they can influence the 
choice of baseline so that it effectively becomes one of the status quo, or 
polluters acknowledge that the MBI solution is initially the cheapest 
solution, but believe that it has risks of being more expensive in the future. 
Of course, polluters may legitimately feel that MBIs are unacceptable 
in the long run, even though they may acknowledge that they are cheaper 
in the short run. The essential reason is that they may feel an MBI will be 
manipulated to their detriment in the future. For example, a tax may be 
raised beyond the level initially justified in environmental terms and be 
used for revenue raising purposes. More subtly, it is more difficult for 
polluters to “capture the regulatory process” when MBIs are used, and 
easier when CAC is used. This means that polluters use their lobbying 
activities to seek favour with the immediate regulators (an inspectorate, for 
example) and to soften the actual implementation of regulations. 
Consequently, while MBIs may be cheaper than CAC, even in the long 
run, the potential for regulatory capture could lead polluters to favour the 
CAC option.  
It seems fair to say that governments often fail to get the baseline 
issue across strongly enough. The usual context will be one where some 
form of regulation has to be introduced, and the issue is which is the best 
form of regulation. Government therefore needs to establish early on what 
the options are. To some extent, this kind of “framing” of policy options 
has been successful. For example, if there was to be no climate change levy 
(CCL), the alternative would be some other form of regulation. The 
baseline cannot be “no action”, because the UK is a signatory of the Kyoto 
Protocol which (once ratified) has emission reduction targets which are 
binding in international law. The industrial lobby against the CCL as 
originally formulated has been substantial. Those who have secured 
concessions have done so, however, on the basis that some alternative 
form of regulation – self-regulation via a negotiated agreement – must be 
adopted. Other policies have, however, failed at this first hurdle. The 
carbon/energy tax proposed by the European Commission, for example, 
was subject to a massive industrial lobby which succeeded because the 
instrument was presented as the sole choice, making it comparatively easy 
for the lobby to “select” the baseline, i.e. no policy at all.  
To avoid incorrect baseline issues, it is essential that the objective of 
the policies should be transparent, and that those objectives should be 
communicated to all stakeholders in persuasive terms. The fiasco over the 
fuel duty escalator (FDE) in the UK is a clear example of a failure to make 
objectives clear.  
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The FDE was originally introduced under the Conservative 
Administration as a “perpetual” surcharge on gasoline and diesel fuels, 
originally at 3 per cent over the Retail Price Index (RPI) (1993), then 5 per 
cent (late 1993), then 6 per cent (1997). In November 1999 it was cancelled 
as an automatic annual price increase, becoming not only discretionary but 
with future increases having the revenues hypothecated to improvements 
in public transport and the road network. In March 2000 all real increase in 
the FDE was cancelled and in November 2000 any increase at all was 
cancelled, which was tantamount to a real price decrease. The political 
background to these changes of intent included early pressure from the 
freight transport sector against rising diesel prices and, ultimately, illegal 
direct action by an unofficial clique of lorry drivers, supported by a smaller 
clique of farmers.6 Many factors contributed to the success of the protest, 
but one important one was the failure of the Labour Government to make 
it clear why the FDE existed.  
In a statement to the House of Commons in 1999, the Chancellor of 
the Exchequer said that the FDE was needed to reduce the £28 billion 
deficit inherited from the previous government. The remark caused 
confusion because the FDE was meant to be an environmental tax. Other 
statements referred to its environmental purpose. None made it clear that 
an environmental tax can be, and usually is, both environmentally oriented 
and a revenue raiser. Second, in the comparatively few public statements 
made about the autumn 2000 protests, Government argued that fuel duty 
could not be cut without sacrificing vital public expenditure. This 
statement was incontrovertibly correct. Every penny lost from fuel duty 
was a penny less available for public expenditure, or a penny that had to be 
made up somewhere else. One of the more remarkable features of the 
public and political debate during the “crisis” was the denial of this fact. A 
kind of Alice-in-Wonderland economics grew up: views were expressed to 
the effect that the Government was “awash” with tax and other revenues 
and hence could “afford” to cut fuel duty. They came perilously close to 
suggesting that the cost of reducing the duty was zero.7 Television stations 
ran public surveys asking respondents if they thought reductions in petrol 
prices were a good thing. Unsurprisingly, since no-one was reminded of 
the cost of reducing prices, substantial majorities declared that they were in 
favour of reducing prices!8 Government was weak in not rebutting these 
views more firmly. But they also generated confusion in arguing that the 
revenue was needed for general public expenditure rather than for 
environmental purposes. Again, technically, they were right. The FDE had 
never been ring-fenced. It was not an hypothecated tax in the true sense, 
though it would have become a partially hypothecated tax had it been 
allowed to continue. But the confusion gave the protesters an upper hand. 
 
6 The role of the farmers is interesting since they do not in fact pay fuel duty on on-farm 
transport  
7 Indeed, the Daily Mail (July 3, 2000) managed the full transition  It declared that the Prime 
Minister's statement that “2 pence off petrol duty would be at the cost of schools and 
hospitals was 'bogus'”, whilst an RAC spokesman was quoted as saying that Mr Blair's 
statement that “2 pence off petrol would cost £1 billion in lost revenues as 'disingenuous'”! 
8 This naïveté in constructing questionnaires is shared by others, however  Many opinion 
polls and questionnaires ask people to say what is desirable without reminding them that 
their choices have opportunity costs  
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If FDE was a general tax and general tax revenues were high, why not 
reduce the FDE? If the FDE was an environmental tax, why did the 
government not say so more forcefully?9 And why did they not play the 
hypothecation card, having already announced that future real rises in the 
FDE would be hypothecated? It would have been a most apposite time to 
play that card: the railway system was being plunged into chaos and the 
need for more and quicker investment in public transport was never more 
evident. Instead, the lack of clarity gave ammunition to the anti-tax lobbies 
by making it look as if taxes explicitly introduced as environmental taxes 
were, in fact, simply revenue raisers. What was needed was a clear 
distinction between environmental taxes that also raise revenues, and 
hypothecated taxes that are environmental taxes that do not raise revenues. 
In its original form, the FDE was the former. In its announced November 
1999 form it was partly the former and partly the latter. Perhaps it was 
judged too difficult to get the distinction across to the public, but it is hard 
to resist the view that Government did not know what the appropriate 
reaction to the protesters was.  
The media also determine the perception of the baseline through their 
preoccupation with losers and indifference to winners. The focus on losers 
arises because, as one leading journalist put it: “the media have a societal 
responsibility to find the loser”.10 
“Finding losers” is part of the culture of journalism. Stories in which 
people or policies succeed, other than spectacularly, are not news. 
Illustrations of losers offered by journalists include “the motorist as 
victim” of the FDE, and “mothers unable to bath children” following the 
introduction of domestic water metering. Motorists may perceive petrol 
prices rising and associate the rise with government policy but not be 
aware of underlying changes in crude oil prices. In this context the 
problem is that fuel prices have several determinants in the market and in 
fiscal policy, and policy impacts are therefore obscured by other factors. 
Similarly, what matters in reality is expenditure rather than price, so that 
economising on fuel by travelling less could save expenditure. The focal 
point however is the price at the petrol pump, not how much motorists 
spend. Water meters may also save money by reducing wasteful uses of 
water without compromising hygiene. But the meter is a physical 
installation and few people compare water bills before and after metering. 
MBIs face formidable problems of media management. Whereas a 
command-and-control measure may cost everyone, firms and households, 
more than a policy based on MBIs, the command and control measures are 
“invisible” with respect to their effect on costs, MBIs are transparent – 
they show up in a market price. MBIs raise costs so there will always be 
losers, and hence the media can always exploit the loser syndrome. Since 
good news is not news, the environmental benefits of MBIs are not news.  
 
9 They even had a study released in June 2000 which showed that heavy goods vehicles 
imposed substantial environmental external costs  Arguably, these costs, around £28,000 for 
a single HGV approximate lorry VED and fuel duties, but the externalities excluded accident 
and congestion costs  Excluding accident costs is arguably justified, but, while there is some 
debate about the relevance of congestion costs, most economists would argue that they are 
externalities  Yet no effort was made to publicise the report – NERA (2000)  
10 Roger Harabin, BBC Today Programme, personal communication, 1999  
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One final factor determining the baseline is countervailing power. 
Polluters are less likely to strive to establish a “no-action” baseline if they 
believe that in so doing they will lose face with the public or with their own 
employees. Many also pay close attention to NGOs. Governments may 
therefore influence the choice of baseline by encouraging countervailing 
power. One very effective measure is the public right to know through, e.g. 
pollution-release inventories. The same notion of countervailing power 
suggests that encouragement needs to be given to coalitions of “gainers” to 
counteract the influence of vocal “losers”. As noted earlier, the case for 
MBIs has tended to lack a pressure group and hence countervailing power 
has not been present. 
 
 In terms of the number and variety of MBIs, the UK has made significant 
advances over the past decade. This much is to be welcomed, and, while 
the Conservative Governments laid the foundations for the switch in 
policy towards an economic-based approach to environmental 
improvement, the Labour Government has shown considerable 
determination in moving this policy forward. But the events of 1999/2000 
have tended to show that the “political grip” on environmental policy has 
not been as strong as it should have been. It is possible that the 
abandonment of the FDE has done only limited damage to the cause of 
MBIs – it seems unlikely that similar opposition will arise to taxes and 
other economic instruments in other sectors. Unfortunately, the failure to 
retain the FDE was a failure in one of the two most important sectors of 
all – transport, the other being agriculture. Unless the transport sector is 
revolutionised in terms of the public/private split, then the very many 
externalities emanating from it – noise, congestion, accidents, local and 
global pollution, and social impacts – cannot be addressed. It is in this 
sense that the tide may have turned against MBIs and the future of 
environmental policy will be all the worse for that.  
One other feature of the environmental debate gives rise for serious 
concern. Politics is, of course, about compromise and keeping stakeholders 
reasonably content. When the conflict is between environmental quality 
and these political concerns, the environment seems, on balance, to be the 
loser. Few other policy areas seem to attract the lobbies associated with 
environmental policy and MBIs in particular. No doubt this is because 
environmental policy is pervasive: it affects costs in industry and 
households alike. But the evidence suggests that the anti-policy lobbies are 
out of proportion to the economic impact of environmental policies: all 
the evidence suggests that environmental policy has little or no impact on 
macroeconomic performance or competitiveness. Why then should there 
be such a fuss when MBIs are announced? One, possibly cynical, answer 
has to be that the lobbyists feel they can succeed and that they can succeed 
fairly easily by shouting quickly and loudly. If that is their perception it has 
to have a foundation and that foundation is that the commitment of 
Government to environmental goals is not as strong as the political 
rhetoric suggests it is. In short, and paradoxically, we have a big debate 
about environmental policy in the UK because it is not a priority for the 
main players. Unfortunately, the Labour Government’s surrender to the 
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fuel protesters may simply have confirmed the adage that the scarcest 
resource of all is political will. 
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2. ECONOMIC 
INSTRUMENTS FOR 
ENVIRONMENTAL 
MANAGEMENT: 
EXPERIENCE IN OECD 
COUNTRIES 
Christian P. Averous and Heino von Meyer11 
 This paper provides a brief overview on key findings concerning the use 
of economic instruments in environmental policies aiming at 
environmental pollution control, natural resource management and 
sustainable development. It first summaries main conclusions from the 
first cycle of OECD environmental performance reviews, which covered 
all OECD member countries and a few non-member countries. The Irish 
Environmental Performance Review was published in 2000. It then 
focuses on two examples of economic instruments that have been studied 
in the most recent reviews: green tax reform (Germany) and tradable 
permits (Iceland). The paper also relies on basic analytical work undertaken 
by the OECD Environment Directorate devoted to economic instruments 
(see References). 
 
 
 
11 The authors are respectively Head of Division and Principal Administrator, OECD 
Environment Directorate  The opinions expressed in this document are those of the authors 
and do not necessarily reflect those of the OECD  The authors are grateful for valuable 
comments from anonymous reviewers and the editors  
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Getting more economic thinking into environmental policies has 
increasingly been seen as necessary to improve the cost-effectiveness of 
environmental policies, and to carry out more demanding policies without 
necessarily requiring any growth in financial resources. A corollary, which 
has been at the heart of the OECD Environmental Performance Review 
programme and is now receiving the attention of Member countries’ 
environmental policy-makers, is: Are governments reaping maximum 
benefits from the substantial resources devoted to environmental 
management? The move towards better integration of environmental 
concerns in economic and sectoral decision-making began to produce 
further gains in environmental effectiveness and economic efficiency in 
the 1990s, and to contribute to the pursuit of sustainable development in 
various economic sectors over the longer term. 
ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTIVENESS OF REGULATIONS 
Since the 1970s, regulatory measures have been used extensively, and 
effectively, to achieve a basic level of environmental quality. This level has 
been reached progressively, mainly by abating pollution from point sources 
and by adopting appropriate prevention and control mechanisms for 
chemicals and hazardous products. During the 1990s, significant 
improvements were achieved in monitoring, enforcement and compliance. 
However, there is great variation among OECD member countries in the 
overall environmental effectiveness of environmental policies. Further, 
regulatory approaches, while effective, have not always delivered results at 
least cost (i.e. have not always been efficient). 
Much often remains to be done to streamline environmental 
legislation, promote pollution prevention, and integrate pollution control 
procedures across different environmental media (e.g. through “one-stop 
shop” arrangements to simplify permitting procedures concerning 
environmental obligations of industrial plants). Similarly, there are 
opportunities to improve environmental management at firm level 
(e.g. improved operation of waste water treatment plants, improved 
environmental management within small and medium-sized industrial 
plants, more cost-effective clean-up of contaminated sites). 
TOWARDS MORE COST-EFFECTIVE MIXES OF REGULATIONS 
AND OTHER INSTRUMENTS 
There is a greater recognition that if future environmental challenges are to 
be met cost-effectively, regulatory command and control approaches will 
need to emphasise pollution prevention, be made more flexible, and be 
used in conjunction with other policy instruments to a greater extent than 
at present. This awareness stems from: 
(i) the need to respond to, and take advantage of, rapid 
technological change;  
(ii) potential savings in pollution abatement costs arising from a 
shift towards cleaner technologies; 
(iii) the growth of expenditures on environmental protection at 
national level and at firm level;  
(iv) the need to reduce current budget deficits and public debt; 
and  
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(v) concern about the competitiveness of enterprises operating 
in the international market.  
The following changes have been emerging.  
First, regulatory instruments, which will undoubtedly need to remain 
at the core of environmental policies, are being supplemented with a range 
of economic instruments (e.g. charges, taxes, tradable permits, deposit-
refund schemes, non-compliance fees, performance bonds, liability 
payments, subsidies for environmental protection) and a range of societal 
instruments (e.g. public consultation and participation, environmental 
information, and environmental education and training) to solve 
environmental issues in a more cost-effective way. 
Second, partnerships with diverse stakeholders (e.g. industrial firms, 
environmental NGOs, local governments and communities), together with 
goal setting and performance-oriented accountability, help delegate 
decision-making concerning the most cost-effective responses, with 
innovative strategies and further progress often resulting. In a growing 
number of countries, environmental policies are now designed to achieve 
both qualitative and quantitative goals and targets. Goal-oriented policies 
have, in many cases, promoted greater accountability and more result-
oriented actions. 
 
 
PROGRESS TO DATE IN OECD COUNTRIES 
The first cycle of reviews indicates that all Member governments have 
achieved satisfactory results with the use of regulatory instruments to 
improve environmental protection. Improvements to the traditional 
command and control approach have been introduced through integrated 
permitting systems and other examples of an overall multimedia approach. 
The command and control approach is now being supplemented with 
other instruments. It is generally accepted that certain limitations inherent 
in regulatory measures can be overcome by employing a mix of 
instruments, i.e. a wider use of economic instruments, voluntary 
agreements, etc. 
The Environmental Performance Reviews have also shown that 
governments recognise the need to give a greater role to the market in 
environmental policy, and to apply the polluter-pays and user-pays 
principles more fully. In addition, many OECD governments recognise the 
importance of moving towards full internalisation of environmental costs 
while acknowledging the economic and political difficulties of achieving 
this goal. Policy responses being considered and introduced include: wide 
application of the polluter-pays and user-pays principles, introduction of 
pollution charges and natural resource fees, taxes on polluting products 
and processes, and removal of subsidies for environmentally harmful 
practices. These increase the cost borne by polluters, induce more cost-
effective pollution prevention measures, reduce the burden on the public 
budget, and promote a move towards production and consumption of less 
polluting goods. As a result, taxpayer and central government expenses are 
gradually being shifted to private firms and households that pollute or use 
natural resources. 
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Progress has been achieved in some countries with the introduction 
of more economic instruments (e.g. charges, fees and taxes related to 
environmental purposes, deposit-refund systems) (Tables 2.1 and 2.2 at the 
end of this chapter, and Annex 2.1). Economic instruments such as 
transferable fishing quotas are being used in a few countries and have 
achieved good results where total fishing quotas were not too high. 
Tradable emission rights have been used successfully to reduce SO2 
emissions and are being tried in other areas. New instruments have been 
introduced that combine economic and regulatory instruments (e.g. new 
systems for the reduction of packaging waste, extended producer 
responsibility) or involve voluntary agreements and eco-label programmes. 
Environmental funds have been set up in a number of countries as a 
means to finance expensive long-term environmental plans and to collect 
various charges, compliance fees, fines and external support (aid). 
The Environmental Performance Reviews have also demonstrated 
that governments are making efforts to reduce general subsidies in a 
number of economic sectors, such as energy, transport and agriculture, 
while taking social considerations into account. Such subsidies tend to 
distort production and consumption patterns; in addition, they may have 
detrimental effects on the environment by stimulating overuse of 
environmental goods or resources or producing greater environmental 
damage, such as land erosion, groundwater exhaustion or pollution, and 
traffic congestion and air pollution. Nevertheless, certain subsidies (e.g. for 
public transport, cleaner technology and waste water treatment facilities) 
can have beneficial consequences for the environment. Green taxes have 
been introduced to protect the environment by discouraging pollution, and 
to promote other government policies by providing necessary funding (e.g. 
for reducing the cost of labour). In other cases, the tax revenues are 
recycled to the group of industries being charged or to the citizens. 
Combining economic incentives for the protection of the environment 
with financing of socially desirable activities is receiving greater support. 
FURTHER PROGRESS TO BE MADE IN OECD COUNTRIES 
Subsidies are provided by many countries in several economic sectors (e.g. 
transport, energy, agriculture, fisheries, forestry) to promote economic and 
social goals other than environmental and economic efficiency. Decreasing 
or removing environmentally damaging subsidies should bring double 
dividends in many cases: less public spending and less environmental 
damage. Similarly, it is expected that a shift from tax on labour towards a 
tax on natural resources use and pollution will help protect the 
environment while stimulating employment. The effect of these measures 
may be marginal in wealthy countries with tight labour markets, but could 
be very significant in less affluent member countries with high 
unemployment. 
In addition, there remain many examples of users who do not pay, 
individually, the full cost of the services they receive. For instance, 
households consuming drinking water do not pay the marginal costs of 
drinking water provision and waste water treatment, and thus overuse a 
resource that is under strain. National governments advocate the user-pays 
principle, but local authorities do not necessarily follow national policies. 
Water pollution control and waste water infrastructures are still supported 
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with public money, reducing the amount charged to users. Irrigation water 
is provided at highly subsidised rates and is abstracted without restraint, 
sometimes causing river beds or aquifers to dry up. Similar examples of 
environmentally harmful price distortions are found in relation to transport 
and energy, leading to excessive use of the goods and services being 
subsidised and greater environmental damage. 
Full implementation of the polluter-pays and user-pays principles is 
often very desirable from an environmental and economic point of view. 
However, decreasing subsidisation could have negative social implications 
(e.g. resources which had been freely available might become unaffordable 
for some population groups in member countries). Greater attention needs 
to be given to the social effects of environmental policies, and special 
measures to make these policies more socially acceptable should be 
considered. 
There remain serious practical difficulties in fully internalising 
environmental damage costs, and in organising compensation for victims 
of serious environmental damage. The public and industry tend to claim 
that, in principle, they favour charging polluters. However, in practice, 
considerable work needs to be done to increase their sensitivity to and 
acceptance of the fact that they should bear the costs of the environmental 
goods and services they use, as well as of the fact that increasing the prices 
of natural resources will help make it possible to preserve these resources 
for current and future generations. 
MARKET INTEGRATION: MAJOR POLICY DIRECTIONS AND 
CHALLENGES 
From the first cycle of OECD Environmental Performance Reviews, the 
following conclusions and recommendations emerged: the polluter-pays 
principle and user-pays principle should be applied more consistently; 
subsidies that have detrimental effects on the environment should be 
eliminated as far as possible; economic instruments should be used more 
often to promote cost-effectiveness, and to guide producer and consumer 
behaviour; consideration should be given to shifting the tax burden from 
labour to natural resources use and pollution; special measures should be 
introduced to cope with social problems arising from the removal of 
subsidies on natural resources use; tradable permit systems for emissions 
and for resources use should be developed at national and international 
levels.  
 
 
 
 
 Over the last decade a “new generation” of economic instruments has 
developed in OECD countries, in the form of an increasing use of 
environmentally related taxes. The “greening” of tax systems in a number 
of member countries has generally followed three complementary 
approaches. First, the introduction of new environmentally related taxes, 
generally applied on environmentally harmful products such as pesticides, 
fertilisers, batteries, motor vehicles, or waste products. Second, a 
2.4. 
 Selected Recent 
Developments 
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restructuring of some existing taxes with a strong environmental relevance 
(e.g. energy products), to include an environmental component; for 
instance, a CO2 tax on energy products has been introduced in Denmark, 
Finland, Norway, Sweden, the Netherlands, and the UK. Third, the 
modification or removal of tax provisions and subsidies with potential 
detrimental effects on the environment (e.g. agriculture subsidies, tax 
provisions in the transport sector). Some countries have implemented 
more comprehensive green tax reforms, consisting primarily of reducing or 
eliminating certain taxes (e.g. reduced income taxes or social security 
contributions), while introducing new environmentally related taxes, but 
without increasing the overall tax burden. 
In the early 1990s, the Nordic countries (Finland, Norway, Sweden, 
Denmark,) were forerunners in introducing green tax reforms (Box 2.1). 
Subsequently other countries followed, like the Netherlands (1995), the 
UK (1996), Italy (1998) and Germany (1999). 
Box 2.1: Green Tax Reforms (First Wave) 
 Finland was the first country to introduce taxes specifically targeting 
CO2 emissions. A mostly uniform carbon tax on fossil fuels (albeit 
with exemptions e.g. for fuels used as reduction agents in metallurgical 
processes) was introduced in 1990 but, later on, additional exemptions 
and refund mechanisms were introduced to favour energy intensive 
industries, and taxation of electricity was moved from fuel usage in 
power plants to the consumption stage. The revenues raised from 
green taxes have been used to partly offset revenue losses stemming 
from cuts made in taxes on labour.  
 Norway followed with a CO2 tax on mineral oils in 1991. A later 
“Green Tax Commission” that presented its report in 1996 placed 
major emphasis on the possibility of achieving a “double dividend”. 
Due to a favourable employment situation when the government 
presented its follow-up proposals to the Parliament in 1998, less 
emphasis was then placed on the double dividend issue; however part 
of the revenue of these taxes has enabled a reduction in income taxes 
and increased support for energy saving investments and renewable 
energy sources.  
 Sweden introduced a major tax reform in 1991 in a strict revenue 
neutral context. A significant reduction in income tax was offset by 
new environmentally related taxes on carbon dioxide and sulphur, by 
a restructuring of energy taxation and by a broadening of the VAT tax 
base. At the same time energy taxes levied on industry were 
significantly reduced. In the budget for 2001, tax increases on diesel, 
heating oil and electricity were combined with tax cuts, including 
lower income taxes and social security contributions. 
 Denmark introduced a CO2 tax on fuels in 1992 and has engaged in a 
general reform of its tax system with a continuing evolution of energy-
related taxes planned until 2002. The main objectives of the reform 
are: the reduction of marginal tax rates in all income brackets; the 
elimination of a series of loopholes in the tax law; and a gradual 
transfer of tax revenue from income and labour to pollution and 
scarce environmental resources. However, many of these taxes have 
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numerous exemptions and a complicated structure that may reduce 
their environmental effectiveness. 
 The Netherlands introduced a general fuel tax in 1988 and a number of 
other environmentally related taxes, for example on waste, 
groundwater, and a new regulatory energy tax in 1995 and 1996. A 
second Green Tax Commission was established in 2000 in order to 
make proposals for a third round of green tax reform to be 
implemented in 2001. 
ECO TAX REFORM IN GERMANY 
In 1999, Germany launched an ecological tax reform as one element in a 
more general restructuring of the tax system. It aims at obtaining a double 
dividend: improving environmental performance while reducing 
unemployment. Increased energy prices would reduce energy intensity and 
improve resource productivity in general; lower labour costs would 
improve conditions for maintaining and creating employment. The eco-tax 
reform is meant to be revenue neutral. Receipts from increased energy 
taxes are to be used to reduce contributions to the statutory pension 
scheme, normally financed equally by employers and employees. This 
reform is designed to reverse the tendency, over the last three decades, for 
the share of labour taxes to increase continuously (up to 66 per cent of 
total tax revenue) while that of environment related taxes and charges has 
remained comparatively small (under 10 per cent) and even fallen in recent 
years. 
The pros and cons of eco-taxation have long been discussed in 
Germany. Various concepts have been put forward, including those of 
environmental NGOs and the scientific community. In 1998, ecological 
tax reform became a top priority of the new coalition government. Its 
implementation constitutes very significant progress in explicitly integrating 
environmental concerns in fiscal policies. Ecological tax reform is being 
implemented in several steps up to 2003. In April 1999, mineral oil taxes 
were increased and a new electricity tax was introduced. At the same time, 
contributions to the pension scheme were reduced by 0.8 percentage 
points, to 19.3 per cent of chargeable income. Between 2000 to 2003, tax 
rates will increase annually for motor vehicle fuel and electricity. 
There is scope for refinement, of course, particularly with respect to 
defining objectives, designing and balancing taxes, and the multiplicity of 
concessions. It cannot be assumed that both objectives (improving 
environmental performance and reducing unemployment) will always be in 
total harmony, at least from a dynamic, long-term perspective. The 
guidance function of the tax, which aims at steering economic actors 
towards environmentally sound behaviour, may eventually conflict with its 
revenue raising function, meant to generate funds for social policy. 
Furthermore, with respect to the environmental dimension of the tax 
reform, there are at least two objectives: achieving energy savings and 
reducing CO2 emissions. Clarification of policy objectives and priorities 
should help in monitoring progress and assessing performance. 
When tax rates were set, it appears that more attention was focused 
on the revenue raising function of eco-taxes than on their potential to 
motivate more environmentally sound behaviour. Firms and households 
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may, in response to taxation, eventually adjust to more environmentally 
beneficial production and consumption modes (using new technologies 
with less energy and raw materials input or pollution output), thus 
producing comparatively less tax revenue for lowering ancillary labour 
costs.   
The steering capacity of the German eco-tax reform, its ability to 
achieve environmental improvements, should not be overestimated. 
In 2003, the reform is expected to result in redistribution of some 2 to 3 
per cent of total German tax revenue. Assuming price elasticities for fuel 
demand of -0.2 to -0.3, potential reductions in demand are likely to be in 
the order of 3 to 5 per cent, compared to a business as usual scenario of 
prolonged trends. The estimated tax-induced reduction of CO2 emissions 
is about 9 million tonnes, or 2 per cent of total emissions; over one-half of 
this amount would come from reductions in passenger traffic emissions. 
Between 1991 and 1998, mineral oil tax rates increased over 60 per cent, 
from DM 0.60 to DM 0.98, while the new reform represents an increase of 
30 per cent by 2003. However, taxes are not the only component 
influencing energy prices. In 1999, the price of crude oil almost tripled 
(from US$ 9 to US$ 26/barrel); in 2000, exchange rate effects (Euro/US$) 
had a far greater impact on fuel prices than did eco-taxation. For electricity 
use the eco-tax reform has even less steering potential.  Despite the 
introduction of the electricity tax, electricity prices dropped dramatically 
in 1999 as the first steps were taken towards liberalisation of the electricity 
market.  
The environmental guidance function of the German eco-tax reform 
is weakened by a number of exemptions and concessions limiting the tax 
burden for industry and agriculture. These are primarily motivated by 
competition concerns, and by the desire to avoid negative trade effects and 
to favour beneficial types of energy production. The concessions are 
neither environmentally effective nor economically efficient: different 
energy sources are taxed differently, without taking account of variations in 
actual or potential environmental impacts or potential development 
opportunities. Power generated by oil and gas is subject to the mineral oil 
tax and electricity tax, while that generated by coal, nuclear plants and 
renewable sources is taxed only once. Revenues from taxation of electricity 
from renewable energy finance a programme to support the market 
penetration of such energy sources. If the environmental relevance of 
energy sources is measured in terms of CO2 emissions alone, the marginal 
tax burden for 1 tonne of CO2 ranged from DM 0 to DM 36/t CO2 in the 
first year (1999) and will be between DM 0 and DM 549/t CO2 in 2003. 
The tax exemption for coal, largely motivated by social objectives, creates 
no incentive to substitute less polluting sources for this emission intensive 
energy source. Tax exemptions and reductions are also seen as a means to 
preserve the international competitiveness of industrial branches, and as 
being necessary until major competitors move in the same direction. 
Modulating tax reductions, taking into account the competitive position of 
these branches, should be considered. 
Assessment of the social implications of German eco-tax reform must 
distinguish several effects: the increased tax burden; the compensatory 
effect of lower social security contributions; repercussions of various tax 
exemptions; the induced effects of employment changes; and, of course, 
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positive impacts on health and the environment. Finally, the overall effects 
of the broader tax reform bundle, of which the eco-tax is only one 
component, should not be ignored. 
Overall, the distributive effects of the eco-tax reform are limited, not 
least because its steering function is limited. For almost all branches of 
industry, the additional tax burden is less than 1 per cent of their turnover 
and the compensation resulting from reduced pension scheme 
contributions is higher; thus, their net balance is positive. Agriculture and 
the retail and transport sectors face a strongly negative balance. 
Households bear the main tax burden: their tax rate is five times higher 
than that of energy intensive industries. Most households benefit from 
compensatory reductions in the amount of their social security 
contributions, but some individuals do not, such as unemployed or non-
employed transfer recipients (e.g. pensioners), civil servants and the self-
employed. 
Even for low-income households, however, the change in disposable 
income will rarely exceed 1 per cent. If induced employment effects of the 
reform are considered, the picture looks even better since the reform will 
improve the situation of the unemployed in particular. For pension 
recipients the disadvantage will only be temporary, as pensions will 
automatically be adjusted according to the development of net incomes in 
general. Households receiving social assistance will be able to claim higher 
allowances for increased heating costs. In addition, electricity used for 
household heating is taxed at only half rate. 
The employment effects of the reform will depend on the outcome of 
wage negotiations. If they neutralise the incentive effects, additional jobs 
are unlikely to be created. Model calculations suggest that over the 
period 2000 to 2005 the tax component of the reform would lead to a loss 
of 17,000 jobs annually, while the reduction in ancillary labour costs would 
result in an additional 93,000 jobs. In the longer term, the net employment 
effect (of the reform compared to a business-as-usual scenario) is 
estimated to be in the order of 50,000 jobs. 
TRADABLE PERMIT SCHEMES 
Transferable or tradable permits (TPs) are increasingly considered as 
opportunities for cost-effective pollution control and natural resources 
management. They are environmentally effective because they are based 
on the setting of specific physical goals or quantified emission or extraction 
limits, guaranteeing the environmental quality or limits specified. TP 
systems can also be economically efficient, in that they minimise the 
overall cost of compliance by encouraging the regulated agents that can 
abate pollution and/or conserve resources more cheaply to do so first, 
while allowing those with higher costs to opt for buying additional 
permits/allowances instead. They also provide greater flexibility for 
regulated agents in their choice of means for achieving the environmental 
objectives. Finally, depending on how the TP scheme is designed, they can 
also ensure better control over the distributive effects of policies, achieving 
desired income distribution or transfers among different groups through 
several methods of initial permit allocation. 
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Four main types of tradable permits can be distinguished (Table 2.3 at 
the end gives more detail): 
• emission reduction credits: acknowledgement at the end of the period 
of the achievement of an emission or abstraction level below the 
one which had been authorised for a given agent, 
• quotas (cap and trade or minimum limits and trade): a quantified 
ceiling or floor assigned to agents for a given period, 
• averaging: the competent authority setting average limit values for 
an entire range of similar products manufactured by firms within 
the same industrial branch, 
• transferable usage rights: formally regulating access to resources that 
are freely available, organising the regulation of the use of 
resources whose ownership is shared, or in the case of building 
and construction rights, alleviating the private property restrictions 
from the standpoint of environmental objectives. 
While in the right circumstances and with careful design TP schemes 
can have the qualities described above, there are a number of issues that 
should be considered when deciding whether to use tradable permit 
schemes or another policy instrument:  
• generally, TPs are less likely to have a negative impact on 
competitiveness compared with regulatory approaches, but each 
case needs to be examined carefully with respect to the initial 
permit allocation and fiscal redeployment to gauge the full effects 
on competitiveness and market power, 
• the compatibility or complementarity of the proposed TP system 
with existing legal and institutional frameworks, regulatory 
regimes, and other instruments that are already in place such as 
taxes and duties or negotiated voluntary agreements,  
• the additional administrative costs and other transaction costs 
involved in establishing and running the scheme need to be 
carefully assessed, 
• the distributive effects arising from the implicit sharing of property 
rights over the environment among the government, firms 
responsible for pollution and/or resource extraction, and citizens 
or residents of the concerned community, 
• the political and social acceptability of the controversial concept of 
the “right to pollute” for firms that are allocated TPs under the 
scheme and, depending on the allocation mechanism chosen, of 
the potential windfall gains (e.g. from grandfathered TPs). 
Until now, only a few countries have functioning TP schemes in 
place. Many countries have considered proposals for TP programmes, and 
have often reached advanced stages in the public decision-making process, 
stopping just short of a final decision to adopt them for implementation. 
The process of designing and successfully launching a TP system requires 
political will, awareness by all the actors involved, and often improving – 
or even overhauling – the existing regulatory and institutional framework.  
Key elements in regulatory and institutional reform required to 
facilitate introduction of a TP system are: 
• a shift from regulations directing particular technology choices to 
the formulation of physical constraints, such as ambient air/water 
quality standards, that are more in-line with environmental 
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objectives and offer greater flexibility in the choice of means to 
achieve compliance, 
• a shift from environmental standards expressed in terms of unit 
and concentrations values to those expressed as absolute/mass 
values (e.g. ceiling or quotas by period),  
• assignment of responsibility for verifying policy implementation to 
independent administrative authorities whose long-term mission 
would be to ensure compliance with regulations and to develop 
transfer activity and fair transactions. 
 
TRADABLE FISHING QUOTA IN ICELAND 
Iceland has established a tradable permit system (ITQ, individual 
transferable quota) to improve management of fish resources.  It reveals 
some of the characteristic challenges in designing such systems. The ITQ 
system is based on vessel catch quotas, calculated as shares in the national 
total allowable catch (TAC), which for a given year is decided on the basis 
of scientific recommendations. The quotas are permanent, perfectly 
divisible and fairly freely transferable. The allocation of quota shares for 
each vessel was based on its share in the catch of each stock in the three 
years leading up to the establishment of individual vessel quotas for fishing 
of that stock. For the major groundfish stocks, this was the period 1981-
83. A vessel can transfer some of its quota between fishing years but its 
quota is lost if it catches less than 50 per cent of its total quota, measured 
in “cod equivalents”, in two subsequent years. There is also a requirement 
that within the year, the net transfer of quota from any vessel must not 
exceed 50 per cent.  
With the introduction of the individual transferable quota 
(ITQ) system, fish catches have been kept within the limits set.  However, 
both the fishing and processing parts of the sector have become more 
concentrated. Quotas have “migrated” among regions. An increasing 
amount of fish is processed on board fishing vessels, further reducing 
supply of raw material to land-based processing installations. Fishing 
quotas are in the hands of a smaller number of firms: 561 firms in 1999, 
down from 1,071 in 1991. Employment in fishing and fish processing 
decreased by 12 per cent between 1990 and 1998.   
The increasing sophistication of quota trading, new markets (such as 
that for “flying fish” shipped fresh by air), increased at-sea processing and 
the growing use of non-Icelandic labour have weakened traditional links 
between fishers, processors and their communities. Some fishers, 
processors and communities have prospered more than others. Following 
a string of complaints and court cases on the fairness of the ITQ system, a 
Supreme Court decision in December 1998 prompted the setting up 
in 1999 of a special committee to evaluate the Icelandic fishery 
management system, including the distributional impact of quota 
allocations. The Althing (Parliament) has established a pricing authority to 
address concerns about payment for the lease of fishing quotas by vessel 
owners and crew. Increased transparency in the public debate on the 
fishery management system, including on quota leasing arrangements and 
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their funding, is needed so that the concerns of various stakeholders can 
be addressed. 
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ANNEX 2.1: ECONOMIC INSTRUMENTS: 
DEFINITIONS 
• Emission charges: direct payments based on the measurement or 
estimation of the quantity and quality of a pollutant. 
• User charges: payments for the cost of collective services. They are 
primarily used as a financing device by local authorities e.g. for the 
collection and treatment of solid waste and sewage water. In the case 
of natural resource management, user fees are payments for the use of a 
natural resource (e.g. park, fishing, or hunting facility). 
• Product charges: applied to products that create pollution either through 
their manufacture, consumption, or disposal (e.g. fertilisers, pesticides, 
or batteries). Product charges are intended to modify the relative 
prices of the products and/or to finance collection and treatment 
systems. 
• Tradable permits are based on the principle that any increase in emission 
or in the use of natural resources must be offset by a decrease of an 
equivalent, or sometimes greater, quantity. Two broad types of 
tradable permit systems are in operation: those based on emission 
reduction credits (ERCs), and those based on ex ante allocations (“cap-
and-trade”). 
• Deposit-refund systems: payments made when purchasing a product (e.g. 
packaging). The payment (deposit) is fully or partially reimbursed 
when the product is returned to the dealer or a specialised treatment 
facility. 
• Non-compliance fees: imposed under civil law on polluters who do not 
comply with environmental or natural resource management 
requirements and regulations. They can be proportional to selected 
variables such as damage due to non-compliance, profits linked to 
reduced (non-) compliance costs, etc. 
• Performance bonds: used to guarantee compliance with environmental or 
natural resources requirements, polluters or users may be required to 
pay a deposit in the form of a “bond”. The bond is refunded when 
compliance is achieved. 
• Liability payments: payments made under civil law to compensate for 
the damage caused by a polluting activity. Such payments can be made 
to “victims” (e.g. in cases of chronic or accidental pollution) or to the 
government. They can operate in the context of specific liability rules 
and compensation schemes, or compensation funds financed by 
contributions from potential polluters (e.g. funds for oil spills).  
• Subsidies: all forms of explicit financial assistance to polluters or users 
of natural resources, e.g. grants, soft loans, tax breaks, accelerated 
depreciation, etc. for environmental protection.  
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Table 2.1: General Overview of the Use of Economic Instruments for Pollution Control 
(Excluding Taxes) 
COUNTRY Charges Tradable 
permits 
Deposit-
refund 
systems 
Non-
compliance 
fees 
Performance 
bonds 
Liability 
payments 
Subsidies 
Australia • • •  •  • 
Austria •  •    • 
Belgium •       
Canada   •      
Canada (Quebec) •  •  • • • 
Canada (Ontario)  •      
Canada (New 
 Brunswick) 
 
• 
  
• 
 
• 
 
• 
  
• 
Canada (British 
 Columbia) 
 
• 
  
• 
    
Canada (Alberta) •    •   
Czech Republic •  • •   • 
Denmark • • •   • • 
Finland •  •   • • 
France • •     • 
Germany •     •  
Greece •   •   • 
Hungary •  • •    
Iceland •  •     
Ireland        
Italy •  •     
Japan •     • • 
Korea •   • •    
Luxembourg        
Mexico •  •     
The Netherlands •  •    • 
New Zealand        
Norway •  • •   • 
Poland • • • •   • 
Portugal        
Spain        
Sweden •  • •  • • 
Switzerland • •     • 
Turkey •  • •  • • 
UK        
US • • •  • • • 
Note: based entirely on questionnaire replies and the EPA report on economic incentives for the US (Anderson et al., 1997); 
non-respondents are entered in bold  
Source: Economic instruments for pollution control and natural resources management in OECD Countries: A survey, OECD, 1999  
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Table 2.2: General Overview of the Use of Economic Instruments for Natural Resource 
Management 
COUNTRY Water 
quantity 
Fisheries Forestry Wetlands Land/soil Natural species/ 
wildlife 
Australia • •    • 
Austria •  •  • • 
Belgium       
Canada   •     
Canada (Quebec)  • • • • • 
Canada (Ontario)       
Canada (New 
 Brunswick) 
      
Canada (British 
 Columbia) 
      
Canada (Alberta) •  •   • 
Czech Republic •  •  • • 
Denmark •  • • • • 
Finland  • •  • • 
France •  •  • • 
Germany •     • 
Greece •    • • 
Hungary • • •  • • 
Iceland  • •  • • 
Ireland       
Italy •      
Japan •     • 
Korea   •   • 
Luxembourg       
Mexico •     • 
the Netherlands • • •  • • 
New Zealand       
Norway*       
Poland •  •   • 
Portugal       
Spain       
Sweden • • • • • • 
Switzerland   • • • • 
Turkey       
UK •  • • • • 
US  •  • •  
Note: based entirely on questionnaire replies and the EPA report on economic incentives for the US (Anderson et al., 1997); 
non-respondents are entered in bold   
* Indicates countries that responded, but not on instruments for natural resource management  
Source: Economic instruments for pollution control and natural resources management in OECD Countries: A survey, OECD, 1999  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2.3: The Four Types of Transferable Permit Schemes 
 Credits Quotas Averaging Usage or 
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abstraction 
rights 
     
Basic 
concept  
Baseline and credit Cap and trade or 
minimum limits and 
trade 
Average product 
requirements 
Individual property 
or user rights 
     
Physical 
basis  
Reductions below 
an agreed baseline 
Total number of  
permits 
The entire product  
range of a firm 
Resource use on  
the basis of free  
access or  
common property  
     
What can be 
transferred 
Only the credits for 
reductions, defined 
in absolute terms, 
can be transferred.  
Permits are  
transferable in full. 
Internal compensation  
can be applied between  
different products for a  
single firm. External  
transfers can take place  
between firms that  
exceed the average limit  
value and those that fall  
below it. 
Different 
components of  
rights can be  
transferred  
separately. 
     
Allocation  Credits are created 
by the difference 
between actual  
performance and  
an agreed 
baseline. They can  
be observed ex  
post or assigned ex 
ante if they are 
perfectly predicted. 
Quotas are  
allocated by a  
public authority in  
the form of  
quantified minima  
or maxima. 
Average limit values are  
set by an administrative  
authority. The volume of  
transferable permits  
depends on the  
production level for each  
product in the range. 
Rights are defined  
by a public  
authority or a local  
community. 
     
Relationship 
with the 
regulatory 
regime 
May be phased in  
as a way of  
introducing 
flexibility into an  
existing regulatory  
system. 
Provision must be 
made for  
introducing the  
transferable quotas 
into the regulatory 
system from the  
outset. 
May be phased in as a 
means of introducing  
flexibility into a product  
standardisation regime. 
 
May be developed  
on the basis of  
traditional 
systems of  
resource use or  
as a substitute for  
them. 
     
Conditions 
of 
participation  
Voluntary: sources  
can simply comply  
with the baseline  
requirements 
without 
participating in the  
validation and  
trading of credits. 
Mandatory in that  
the specified  
minima or maxima  
must be complied  
with even if there  
are no transfers.  
Possible provisions  
for voluntary opting- 
in or early  
programmes. 
Mandatory: compliance 
 with regulatory  
requirements depends  
on the average  
performance of products  
in the range.  
Participation in external  
transfers is voluntary. 
 
Mandatory in that 
the new rights are  
binding on all  
parties. 
     
Examples  
 
The US federal  
offset programme  
to control local air  
pollution requires  
new sources to  
obtain credits from  
other existing  
sources. 
The US Acid Rain  
programme sets an  
annual maximum  
emission level for  
the power  
generating sector,  
individual 
allowances, and a  
national perimeter  
within which quotas  
can be traded. 
The mobile source 
emissions programme  
in the US. Since 1998  
manufacturers of boat  
engines must reduce  
total hydrocarbon  
releases from new  
engines sold on the  
market by 75% over a 9  
year period. 
New Zealand uses 
transferable 
individual quota  
schemes for the  
management of  
33 species of fish. 
 
Source: Domestic Transferable Permit Systems for Environmental Management: Design and Use, OECD, 2001  
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3. ARE TRADABLE 
EMISSION PERMITS  
THE WAY TO GO? 
John Fitz Gerald, Daniel McCoy, Jonathan Hore12 
 When we first began work in the early 1990s on the economics of 
global warming there was still considerable scientific doubt as to whether 
the phenomenon posed a real and serious danger to the world (Fitz Gerald 
and McCoy, 1992). However, over the course of the last ten years, new 
research and evidence of very rapid warming have greatly strengthened the 
case for intervention by countries throughout the world. While the 
magnitude of the problem is still clouded in scientific uncertainty, its reality 
is now widely accepted. The Earth has warmed by 0.5oC in the last century 
while atmospheric concentrations have increased by over 30 per cent in the 
same timeframe. The United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change (IPCC) have drawn a connection between these trends by 
concluding that … the balance of evidence suggests that there is a discernible human 
influence on global climate. The recommendation is a world-wide reduction in 
greenhouse gas emissions. 
The international response was the 1997 Kyoto Protocol (see Box 
3.1) where industrialised countries agreed to legally binding emission 
reductions, subject to individual country ratification, on the basis of 1990 
greenhouse gas levels by the period 2008-2012. The decision by the 
incoming Bush administration in the United States to abandon the Kyoto 
protocol, while not surprising, has raised major fears elsewhere in the 
world, especially in Europe. However, even without US participation, it 
was agreed in Bonn this year that the EU and many other signatories will 
proceed with implementation of the Kyoto Protocol. The fact that the 
participants are confined to the developed world is seen as a major 
obstacle to its potential success in the very long run. This was one of the 
main arguments put forward by US opponents of the protocol. 
It means that in the long run economic activity that generates major 
greenhouse gas emissions could migrate from countries imposing costly 
restrictions on emissions to parts of the world that have not signed up. 
 
12 John Fitz Gerald is a Research Professor and Head of the Energy Policy Research Centre, 
Daniel McCoy is a Senior Research Officer and editor of The Quarterly Economic Commentary 
and Jonathan Hore is a Research Assistant at The Economic and Social Research Institute   
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While in the short term, which in this context is over the next decade, the 
degree of potential diversion of economic activity to countries where 
emissions of greenhouse gases are unrestricted is likely to be small, in the 
longer term such diversion could be very substantial. Many studies, such as 
those by the OECD (Burniaux et al., 1992), indicate that in the very long 
run no satisfactory control on emissions is possible if major economies 
such as India and China are not participating. To this extent the US 
arguments have some validity.13 
However, the developed world emits massively more greenhouse 
gases per head of population than the third world. In this light, the 
decision in the Kyoto protocol to go ahead first with practical measures to 
control emissions in the developed world seems both just and sensible. A 
start has to be made somewhere. However, the US is the most prolific 
emitter of greenhouse gases per head of population of any major country 
in the world, and their adoption of a free-rider approach poses significant 
dangers for other potential signatories. It would allow the possibility of 
major diversion of economic activity that is polluting from other parts of 
the developed world that impose costly restrictions, to the US. While some 
diversion to the less developed world might be acceptable to signatories, 
granting such an advantage to the US is likely to be less acceptable to 
electorates elsewhere in the developed world. 
In spite of this setback, the EU, along with other developed 
economies, now proposes to proceed with the Kyoto protocol and 
implement restrictions on emissions within its own borders. In beginning 
the process of policy implementation it may hope to lead from the front. 
However, unless some mechanism can be found to bring the US on board 
over the course of the decade, there will remain doubts about the ability of 
the EU and other participating states to proceed unilaterally. As 
enforcement becomes increasingly costly the potential for diversion of 
business activity to the US will increase. With such diversion the pressures 
to either slow implementation or to enter into a trade war with the US 
could increase. 
From Ireland’s point of view it seems best to proceed on the basis 
that the Kyoto protocol and the related emissions limits for Ireland will 
enter into force in 2008. At least initially, the cost of compliance will 
probably not be unacceptable to the citizens of the EU as a whole. 
However, there remains the possibility that for individual countries, sectors 
of industries, or particular groups in society that the cost of 
implementation could prove unacceptably high. 
This paper first considers in Section 3.2 the magnitude of the 
problem facing Ireland in reaching the targets for greenhouse gas 
 
13 Game theory can throw some light on this problem  The nature of the environmental 
problem is global and displays public good type characteristics of non-excludability and non-
rivalness in relation to the benefits of abatement  In this context “free riding” behaviour will 
overcome the capacity for a self-enforcing agreement  A self-enforcing agreement can only 
be maintained when the global “net” benefits are about the same as no agreement  When a 
complete agreement cannot be reached which would deliver the greatest total abatement, a 
partial agreement where some countries do a lot and others free ride may deliver less than in 
a complete non co-operation outcome  The rationale of “virtuous” European behaviour in 
the current geopolitical context requires serious consideration unless it clearly provides other 
beneficial outcomes  
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emissions set as part of the Kyoto protocol. We then consider in Section 
3.3 the likely policy instruments that will be used to achieve the targets in 
as efficient a manner as possible. In Section 3.4 we discuss the likely 
distributional impact of the policies needed to achieve the necessary 
reduction in emissions. In Section 3.5 we describe an alternative eco-tax 
solution, and Section 3.6 presents our conclusions. 
Box 3.1: The Kyoto Protocol on Climate Change 
A meeting of over 150 countries was held in Kyoto, Japan in December 
1997 at the third Conference of the Parties (COP-3) to the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCC). The end result was 
the adoption of a legally binding international agreement for climate 
protection – the Kyoto Protocol. Over 160 countries at the 1992 Earth 
Summit in Rio de Janeiro signed the first international climate change 
treaty, and the Kyoto Protocol represents the culmination of years of 
negotiations to fortify this agreement. The main points of the Protocol are 
as follows: 
• Article 3 sets out the Targets and Timetables. It provides that thirty-
nine of the most developed countries should reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions by an aggregate 5.2 per cent from 1990 levels between the 
period 2008-2012. Each nation has a different target, ranging from an 
8 per cent reduction (the European Union) to a 10 per cent increase 
(Iceland). Table 3.1 details the requirements for some of the world’s 
largest economies. Each party must show verifiable progress towards 
meeting its target by 2005. 
• The gases covered by the Protocol are carbon dioxide (CO2), methane 
(CH4), nitrous oxide (N2O), hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), 
perfluorocarbons (PFCs) and sulphur hexaflouride (SF6). These six 
gases are treated as a “basket”. This allows a degree of flexibility in 
reaching the target as reductions in one gas can be substituted for 
reductions in others.  
• Article 4 allows Parties to join together in order to meet their target. 
This provision satisfied the demand from the EU that it should be 
permitted to comply as a group or multi-country “bubble”. In this 
case, the burden of its required 8 per cent reduction is shared between 
countries based on forecast growth rates, with converging countries 
permitted some increase in emissions (see Table 3.1). 
• The Protocol allows for Carbon Sinks, i.e. land and forestry practices 
that remove carbon emissions from the atmosphere. They represent a 
low-cost option to governments, but are defined ambiguously in the 
Protocol and will prove difficult to measure. 
The Protocol also introduced three “flexible mechanisms” that are 
intended to facilitate cost-effective implementation.  
1. Emissions Trading (Article 16). Polluting entities in individual 
countries are allocated permits for their emissions of greenhouse gases 
consistent with the government’s target, and these can be traded on 
the international market.  
2. Joint Implementation (Article 6). This is where one nation gets credit 
for implementing a project to reduce emissions or enhance sinks in 
another country. 
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3. Clean Development Mechanism (Article 12). Similar to Joint 
Implementation but with additional safeguards and provisions, this 
allows developed countries to gain reduction credits for investments 
in appropriate projects in developing countries. 
There are many issues still to be resolved. No agreement was reached on 
the participation of developing countries, yet it is predicted that they will 
produce the largest share of carbon emissions by the middle of the century 
(especially China and India). Furthermore, the Protocol has left specifics 
on emission trading, the clean development mechanism, carbon sinks and 
compliance and enforcement to be defined at a future date.  
Table 3.1: Quantified Emission Limitation or Reduction 
Commitment (Percentage of Base Year) 
Party % Party % 
Australia 108 Ireland 113 
Canada 94 Germany 79 
USA 93 France 100 
Japan 94 Greece 125 
Russian Federation 100 Spain 115 
Total EU 92 UK 88.5 
Source: 
 
 The main source of emissions of greenhouse gases in Ireland is the 
burning of fossil fuels (oil, coal and gas) and agriculture. When fossil fuels 
are burned, either directly in boilers or fires for heating purposes, or 
indirectly to provide power (cars or electricity), the carbon in the fuel 
combines with oxygen in the air to produce carbon dioxide (CO2). In the 
case of agriculture, the single biggest source of emissions is the cattle herd, 
which produces methane (CH4) as part of the digestive process. Figure 3.1 
shows the sources of greenhouse gas emissions in Ireland in 1998.  
 
 
 
Figure 3.1: Sources of Greenhouse Gases in Carbon Dioxide 
Equivalents in Ireland, 1998 
 
 
3.2  
The Magnitude 
of the Problem 
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have changed the incentives within the electricity-generating sector. 
Whereas in the 1990s significant subsidies were needed to encourage 
investment in non-polluting wind energy, technical progress and market 
forces now make such investments commercially attractive. 
The changing environment for agriculture within the EU has the 
potential to make a significant contribution to the task of reducing 
emissions. The combination of EU Common Agricultural Policy reform 
and the impact of the BSE crisis have together made cattle rearing 
extremely unattractive from an economic point of view. The returns to 
farmers from this type of agriculture were never great but they are now 
very low. While income supports from Brussels and the Irish government 
to some extent ameliorate the problem, there remains the possibility that 
future CAP reform could provide an economic opportunity to protect 
both farm incomes and the environment. A change in incentives to 
encourage farmers to move away from cattle to other forms of land use 
could result in a reduction in Irish greenhouse gas emissions. For example, 
a gradual shift from cattle rearing into forestry could provide a double 
benefit – a reduction in methane emissions together with an increase in the 
quantity of carbon fixed in trees (which further reduces net emissions of 
greenhouse gases). 
While the magnitude of the problem facing the Irish economy in 
meeting the Kyoto emissions limits is clear, there is less certainty about 
how this target is to be reached in an efficient and fair manner. We still 
lack much of the scientific and economic information necessary to quantify 
the costs and benefits of alternative policies. While work has been done on 
the electricity generating sector, such as Conniffe, Fitz Gerald, Scott, and 
Shortall (1997), we have much less understanding of how policy changes 
would affect the transport and the agriculture sectors. As a result, while the 
magnitude of the task facing Ireland over the coming decade is clear, the 
likely cost of achieving the target is much more uncertain. 
 
 Given the uncertainties surrounding the causes and impact of global 
warming, the costs and benefits from the abatement of greenhouse gas 
emissions are consequently also uncertain. The implementation of cost 
effective, risk reduction strategies in such a context becomes of central 
importance. While the arsenal of economic solutions for environmental 
problems is broad, ranging over prohibitions, issuing of standards, 
application of subsidies, the use of charges, taxes, fees, the creation of 
quasi-markets for tradable permits: they essentially boil down to price or 
quantity based solutions. 
An efficient solution in the economic context is not just an explicit 
least-cost solution for a given target (or emission reduction), it also has to 
account for additional costs and benefits in terms of society’s well-being or 
welfare. The impact of any environmental policy will give rise to a host of 
spill-over effects that can only really be best captured by a modelling 
approach.15 The use of models can provide fresh insights not available 
 
15 See Fankhauser and McCoy (2000) for a description of the various models used to analyse 
the economic impacts of environmental policies  These include traditional macroeconometric 
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from other sources but by their nature they are often impenetrable, making 
their conclusions less intuitively appealing. 
The distinctive difference between quantity and price based solutions 
is that while as a regulator one is fairly sure of the outcome with quantities, 
such as permits, one is unsure at what cost this is achieved. The alternative 
with price based solutions is that the outcome in terms of quantity is 
uncertain but the costs are likely to be minimised as individual agents make 
informed decisions given the price facing them. When permits are tradable 
among participants they also posses the efficiency properties of price based 
mechanisms (Baumol and Oates, 1988). Under conditions of certainty 
about costs and benefits the tradable permit system is equivalent in 
efficiency terms to a price based system (taxes). 
One relatively simple model presented by Martin Weitzman (1974) in 
a seminal contribution showed that price and quantity based solutions 
could be equivalent under conditions of uncertainty. The Weitzman 
theorem had an intuitive appeal, allowing policy-makers to choose either a 
price based approach, like carbon taxes, or a quantity based approach, like 
emission quota trading, to dealing with problems, such as greenhouse gas 
abatement. Given its significance it is worth exploring what it says. 
Weitzman demonstrated that when there is uncertainty about the 
marginal16 benefits of pollution abatement (that is, uncertainty about the 
damage being done by the pollutants) there is no difference in terms of 
economic efficiency between a quantity or price based approach. When 
there are uncertainties about the marginal costs of abatement (that is the 
regulator is uncertain about the economic costs faced by agents in reducing 
pollution) then the relative sensitivity of marginal benefits and marginal 
costs will determine which system is preferred. When the marginal benefits 
are more sensitive than marginal costs to additional abatement, the 
quantity based system is preferred.  
The logic in the Weitzman theorem in the context of international 
global warming emission reduction agreements runs as follows. The 
scientific uncertainty about the impact of greenhouse gas emissions means 
that the damage function is not clearly known and consequently the 
position of a marginal benefit curve is also uncertain. This does not give a 
clear guidance on whether permits or taxes are preferred just that both are 
likely to be equally wrong in terms of welfare.  
When the regulator in addition is uncertain about the marginal costs 
facing the economy being regulated then it is a matter of “merely” 
determining the relative slopes of the marginal cost and benefits curves. 
The quantity based approach is preferred when the marginal benefits are 
steeper than the marginal cost curve, consistent with the situation when 
there are threshold effects and getting quantity right is important. When 
the potential costs of abatement can be quite high then price based systems 
offer advantages. 
 
models, resource allocation models like input-output models and computable general 
equilibrium models, and integrated assessment models that combine economic and ecological 
components  
16 Marginal in economic terms is an additional unit of activity, in this case an additional unit 
of abatement effort  
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The result coming from Kyoto, as with preceding attempts at 
international climate agreement, is that price and quantity based 
instruments cannot be viewed as alternative mechanisms for obtaining the 
same outcome. Price mechanisms lead to uncertain emission outcomes 
while quantity mechanisms give rise to uncertain cost considerations. It has 
been shown that the nature of the uncertainty is such that price 
mechanisms are preferable in this context. Pizer (2000) estimates that price 
mechanisms generate up to five times the net expected benefits associated 
with a prudent quantity control. The magnitudes in favour of prices also 
held sway a decade earlier after the 1992 Earth Summit but, in the guise of 
eco-taxation or carbon taxes, did not find acceptance (McCoy, 1997).17 
The price mechanism need not take the form of a carbon tax. Indeed 
to ensure acceptability and to encourage implementation, the offshoot 
from Kyoto was to opt for a tradable permits component backed by some 
form of charges.18 The main feature of a price based mechanism is to 
allow the polluter to pay the fine if abatement costs turn out to be much 
higher than expected. A hybrid system would allow the use of a quantity 
based tradable permit system with the safety valve of allowing agents to 
opt to pay a fine if costs turned out higher than expected. This idea was 
first put forward by Roberts and Spence (1976) but has been championed 
in recent months by the influential Washington based institute Resources 
for the Future. 
The EU has also taken to the idea of tradable permits as it gets 
around the sensitivities with individual member states’ rights to decide 
taxation. In addition, tradable permits seem to confer a valuable property 
right, viewed at least implicitly as a gain rather than a loss as with 
taxation.19 The revenue from trades does accrue to the owner, the State 
only gets revenue if it decides to allocate initially through auction. The idea 
of marketable or tradable permits was first put forward by Dales (1968) 
and these have been successfully implemented in the US for trading in lead 
and sulphur emissions. This success has prompted the renewed 
international interest in permit systems. Given the intention of the EU to 
proceed with the Kyoto protocol and to use tradable permits at a pan-
European level, there is a compelling case for implementing the national 
quota for Ireland using a similar framework. The main implementation 
issue will be acceptability of this system and for this distributional features 
are paramount.  
 
 
 
17 Carbon taxes in addition to providing an incentive to reduce emissions were also capable 
of providing significant on-going revenues to governments  The potential to use the revenues 
to remove other distortions in the economy were described by Pearce (1991) as a “double 
dividend” from environmental taxes  Fitz Gerald and McCoy (1992) indicated that the 
recycling of the revenues to reduce pay related social insurance was capable of providing a 
substantial additional dividend in terms of reduced unemployment at that time  
18 Charges or fees are less emotive terms than taxes but are basically the same as any 
hypothecated tax  
19 The notion of differing perceptions about gains and losses are quite important for 
valuation purposes as environmental economists have found out  The expected theoretical 
equivalence of willingness to pay to secure a benefit with the willingness to accept 
compensation for incurring a loss is often found not to hold in practice   
46 GREEN AND BEAR IT 
 
Given that it seems likely that tradable emissions permits will be a major 
part of the policy package adopted at the EU level, and hence in Ireland, 
we focus first on this policy instrument. Here we consider the likely 
distributional impact. However, as discussed at the end of this section, the 
effects of a carbon tax strategy would in practice be very similar to that of 
tradable permits.20 Four different distributional effects arising from 
tradable permits are considered. First, the direct implications for the 
distribution of income between EU members states. Next we consider the 
impact on the distribution of incomes within Ireland – between consumers 
and producers, and then between rich and poor. Finally, we discuss the 
possible impact of such measures on different sectors and different 
companies. 
In the case of the distribution of income within Ireland a crucial 
factor will be how the right to emit greenhouse gases is allocated. This 
allocation decision also has far reaching implications for the cost of policy 
implementation. If the right to pollute is appropriately charged for then the 
revenue can be used to reduce other distortionary taxes elsewhere in the 
economy. On the other hand, if it is given away free to existing polluters 
there will be no funds available to reduce existing distortions. 
3.4.1 DISTRIBUTIONAL EFFECTS IN THE EU 
The EU have agreed an allocation of emissions rights for the period 2008-
2012. In the case of Ireland it is agreed that emissions over that period can 
amount to 13 per cent above the 1990 level. In the case of some countries, 
such as Germany and the UK, they are required to actually cut emissions 
compared to the 1990 level. Under a tradable permit regime each country 
will be deemed to have received permits to emit the specified tonnage of 
greenhouse gases over the period 2008-2012. These permits can then be 
sold or given away within each country. For individual companies or 
households they will be only permitted to emit greenhouse gases if they 
have acquired or been given a permit for the requisite amount. In principle 
it will be left up to individual countries to decide how they allocate the 
permits. 
The allocation of these permits across the different EU members has 
been done in an essentially arbitrary manner. It is based on historical 
emissions levels rather than an auctioning process. This process is often 
referred to as “grandfathering” or “grandparenting”. At the time the 
decision was made the information was not available on how difficult it 
would be for each country to reach its required target. As a result, if there 
were no provision for a reallocation of these permits or quotas between 
countries, then the EU would find that some member states are carrying a 
heavy burden and some a lighter burden after 2008. If there were no 
possibility to trade these permits between countries (or companies) the 
result would be a loss in aggregate activity at the EU level. This would 
represent a significant efficiency cost when compared to an alternative 
 
20 We do not deal with some special mechanisms such as Joint Implementation that are also 
likely to be part of the international programme to tackle the problem of global warming  
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allocation that left the costs of meeting the Kyoto limits equal (per tonne 
of greenhouse gases avoided) across the EU. 
In the absence of detailed information on costs of abatement, the 
most efficient solution is to allow countries or individual holders of 
emissions permits to trade them within the EU. If the price on the 
international market for the right to emit a tonne of gas is higher than its 
value to the individual holder then the holder will sell it. The resulting 
international price will reflect the lowest cost method of reducing 
greenhouse gas emissions. This would ensure that the marginal cost of 
abatement is equalised across member states and that aggregate economic 
activity is maximised.  
While such a regime will deal with the efficiency costs involved in the 
arbitrary allocation of emissions permits, it will still involve significant net 
transfers between different EU members. Unless, by some miracle, the 
allocation proves ex post to have equalised marginal abatement costs across 
member states, some countries (or their citizens) will be net buyers of 
quota and others will be net sellers. Such an outcome would represent a 
transfer of resources between member states, in the same way that the 
structural funds or the EU budget represents a transfer. 
While the transfers between member states will initially probably be 
small, as such a regime moves beyond 2012 they could grow in magnitude. 
As a result, it is important that the EU builds in a review process to ensure 
that the aggregate income transfers from emissions trading do not grow 
too large and that they do not negate the EU’s other objectives, in 
particular the cohesion objective. 
3.4.2 A TRADABLE EMISSIONS REGIME IN IRELAND 
In considering the appropriate policies to adopt to ensure that Ireland 
meets its target for emissions, an important consideration is the level at 
which emissions are monitored and at which policies to control emissions 
are imposed. For instance, in the case of sulphur dioxide (which is not a 
greenhouse gas), emissions regulation generally takes place at the level of 
the plant which actually releases the sulphur into the atmosphere. But, in 
the case of sulphur dioxide, the number of significant emitters is small and 
the location of the emission is also important.  
In the case of greenhouse gases neither of these considerations 
applies. Every car, every household that uses an open fire, every business 
that uses a central heating boiler, emits carbon dioxide. In the case of 
agriculture every cow and sheep is also an emitter. It is clearly not practical 
to monitor and control emissions at such a dis-aggregated level in a 
modern economy. If, instead, it were decided to regulate, for example, the 
top fifty plants in Ireland, this would leave uncontrolled the bulk of 
emissions. It would also provide a major incentive for firms to reduce 
plant size so as to fall below the threshold. This would cause serious 
distortion in the economy, especially if such a regime were in place for 
many years. 
The obvious solution in the case of carbon dioxide is to monitor and 
regulate the import and production of fossil fuels. Already, in the case of 
oil, this is part of the arrangements for excise taxes. An extension of this to 
cover gas and coal would not involve a major number of market players. 
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As a result, for administrative reasons, it seems certain that in Ireland the 
only practical way to implement policies designed to ensure compliance 
with the Kyoto limits will be through monitoring the importers and 
producers of primary energy. This will involve monitoring the behaviour of 
the existing oil and coal importers. In addition, as power generators, 
including the ESB, are also likely to import primary energy (in the form of 
coal, oil and gas) on their own behalf, their behaviour will also have to be 
monitored. 
Obviously, where firms use primary energy in a production process 
which fixes that energy in a form which does not leak directly into the 
atmosphere (as is the case in some chemical processes), exemptions could 
be made, provided that these companies’ use of fossil fuels was also 
independently monitored. 
While this approach to monitoring and regulation is the only practical 
one in an economy such as Ireland’s, it has certain disadvantages. In 
particular, it makes it difficult to exempt particular firms or businesses 
unless their activities are subject to special monitoring. Not withstanding 
the strong economic grounds in a global context for arguing against 
exemptions for any firms or sectors, the partial nature of the Kyoto 
protocol (especially if it excludes the US) may require some limited 
exemptions for very intensive energy users in the tradable sector.21 
However, such exemptions may be difficult to implement if such energy 
users are not themselves importers or producers of primary energy. It is 
the case that they will be buying from importers who are subject to quotas 
and so will be indirectly paying. In such a case it might be necessary to use 
an imputation system, which allowed for costs incorporated into domestic 
inputs. A fuller version of such an imputation scheme is discussed in 
Poterba (1991). 
In spite of these minor problems, given the industrial structure of the 
Irish economy, the imposition of monitoring and regulation (be it quotas, 
taxes or voluntary agreements) on importers and producers of primary 
energy seems the only practical solution. The advantage of this design is 
that it would greatly simplify the cost of implementation and it would 
provide the appropriate incentives to all users of energy to minimise 
emissions. A scheme where the output of the electricity industry was 
regulated, rather than requiring firms to buy permits or pay taxes on their 
inputs, would significantly reduce the incentives to reduce emissions and 
significantly increase the cost of meeting Ireland’s emissions targets.  
This is because the price rise of carbon rich inputs into electricity 
generation would encourage substitution away from those inputs whereas a 
price rise (or other regulation) on electricity produced would discourage 
electricity consumption but would not encourage more environmentally 
attractive types of generation. In addition, the essentially arbitrary nature of 
the regulatory approach could provide a strong disincentive to new 
entrants into the market, reducing or eliminating the prospect of 
competition. 
 
21 Failure to provide for such limited exceptions would see such businesses move to 
unregulated locations, with no net improvement in global emissions  
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In the case of the agriculture sector a more simplified approach to 
monitoring and regulation of emissions will have to be taken. Clearly 
metering the emissions from animals is not a viable, nor attractive, option. 
Instead a more indirect approach where numbers of ruminants are 
monitored and where the incentives under the EU Common Agricultural 
Policy are restructured to meet the environmental needs of the EU 
economy is likely to prove the most practicable. The change in incentives 
(taxes or subsidies) for cattle production should reflect the likely market 
value of the abatement of a tonne of greenhouse gases. 
Allocation of Permit Quotas 
There are two different methods of allocating quota (the right to emit 
greenhouse gases) within Ireland. In the first, the permits can be given to 
existing polluters on the basis of their current levels of emissions. 
Alternatively, the permits can be auctioned off to the highest bidders and 
the resulting revenue can be used to reduce taxes elsewhere, or to increase 
government expenditure, for example on welfare transfers or investment in 
research on energy efficiency. 
One of the primary reasons why this type of approach has been 
favoured by existing industry is that they see the prospect that quotas 
would initially be allocated to those who are already emitting (polluting). 
This would have a number of advantages for them over taxation:  
• The cost to them of conforming to the specified amount of pollution 
would be offset by the value of the quota granted to them. 
• It would guarantee the position of incumbents against new entrants 
into the market, preventing competition. 
The issue of whether the rights to emit greenhouse gases are handed 
out to existing emitters and the implications of the regime for competitive 
markets is central to the question of the long-term economic impact of any 
greenhouse gas abatement policy. 
A clear conclusion can be drawn from economic research that 
“grandparenting” of greenhouse gas emission rights is likely to have a 
serious adverse impact on the economy (Parry, Williams and Goulder, 
1997). This adverse impact arises from the fact that all restrictions on 
production and consumption, such as taxes, have serious negative effects. 
However, in the case of taxes or auctioned quotas, the revenue is available 
to the state to reduce distortionary taxes elsewhere, offsetting the 
damaging effects of the regime. However, if, as with “grandparenting”, the 
revenue is foregone, the state has no means of offsetting the negative 
effects.  
In addition to the negative effects on economic efficiency, giving the 
potential revenue away to existing polluters is likely to have serious 
negative income distribution implications. The solution to this particular 
problem is to auction off the right to  
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emit.22 In this case the revenue would accrue to the state and could be 
used to reduce other distortionary taxes, to compensate those on low 
incomes hit by higher prices, and to fund investment in areas such as 
energy efficiency. In the US, to date, while accepting that this is the best 
solution in terms of national welfare, the “grandparenting” route has been 
followed because of the strength of the lobby of incumbents. The fact that 
the US has adopted a seriously sub-optimal solution in the face of political 
pressures should not be taken as a desirable precedent for the EU. 
Distributional Effects Within Ireland 
If a tradable emissions regime is implemented in the EU and Ireland 
participates fully in it then all importers or producers of primary energy 
will have to acquire permits for each tonne of carbon equivalent fuel that 
they import. Even if they are granted these permits free through a 
“grandparenting” process they will be free to use the permit either to buy 
fuel or to sell the permit within Ireland or abroad to other businesses. If 
the holders of the permits choose to continue to import and sell energy in 
Ireland they will then charge Irish consumers the usual price for the energy 
they import plus the price they could get for the emissions permit on the 
EU market. If they did not pass on the value of the permit in higher prices 
they would be worse off than if they had gone out of business and sold on 
the permits. 
In the case of an auction where importers have to buy the permits on 
the EU market to allow them to import, it is equally clear that they will 
pass on the cost of the permit to consumers through higher prices. Thus, 
whether tradable emissions permits are “grandparented” or auctioned, the 
full EU market price for the permits will be charged to consumers. This 
process will be identical to the current excise tax regime where importers 
pay a tax (rather than buying an emissions permit) when they import the 
energy and then pass on the cost of the tax to consumers in higher prices. 
Where there is a potential difference is that in a “grandparenting” 
regime the owners of the companies importing energy receive a major 
windfall gain, a gain that is paid for by consumers through higher prices. If, 
on the other hand, the firms involved have to buy the permits, they then 
do not receive any benefit from the new regime. However, under an 
auction regime the state has the benefit of the revenue from the permits, 
revenue that will ultimately be paid by the household sector anyway, and it 
can use the revenue to reduce taxes elsewhere or to improve services for 
households. 
 
22 If all of the 2008-2012 quota is sold at once there will be complicated issues in terms of 
the management of the public finances and how they are treated under the terms of the 
Maastricht treaty  For example, if all of the quota for the 2008 to 2012 period were sold off 
in 2008, then the revenue received should be applied to reducing other taxes evenly over the 
whole period  However, in terms of the government accounts, it would show a big surplus in 
2008, with corresponding small deficits in future years  If the total value of the quota was 
large, and the regime was applied at an EU level, the overall financing implications of such a 
regime and the implications for the EU financial system would need to be considered  The 
example, of the mobile phone auctions in the EU over the last two years is instructive in this 
regard  
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It is only where firms are selling an energy intensive product on a 
world market where many countries are not signatories of the Kyoto 
protocol that they will not be able to pass on the cost of permits to the 
buyers of the product. In this particular case the incidence of the cost of 
the permits will fall on the owners of the relevant firms, or possibly on its 
employees if they accept lower wages to keep the firm competitive. Even if 
such firms receive permits free they will still be able to sell the permits on 
the world market and move their operation out of Ireland to a location 
where energy costs are lower. Any attempt to restrict firms from selling on 
the permits will only increase inefficiency (Hagem, 1998). 
This latter case, where firms can not pass on the cost increase, is likely 
to be quite exceptional, being confined to a few cases where firms are 
operating a very energy intensive process. In a very open economy, such as 
Ireland’s, the ultimate impact of taxes or charges imposed by the state will 
tend to be on those living in Ireland. In a competitive market it is difficult 
for trading firms to pass on such costs as higher prices to the outside 
world. The study by Fitz Gerald and McCoy (1992) showed that the effect 
of carbon taxes (excluding the effects of revenue recycling) would be to 
reduce household income. 
Thus the ultimate impact of any measures to combat global warming 
will be primarily on domestic households. Very similar conclusions were 
reached in analysing the potential effects of an emissions trading regime on 
the US (Congressional Budget Office, 2000). If permits are auctioned (or 
carbon taxes are levied) then the revenue to the state can be used to offset 
this cost to households. If such revenue is given away through 
“grandparenting” then the cost on the household sector will be greatly 
increased and the economic efficiency costs of the measures will also be 
significantly augmented (Parry, Williams, and Goulder, 1997). 
Within the household sector the cost of any measures to combat 
global warming is likely to fall disproportionately on poorer households. 
Scott (1992) has shown that poorer households spend a significantly higher 
proportion of their income on energy than do richer households. Figure 
3.3 shows what would have happened if the original EU proposals on 
carbon taxes had been implemented in the early 1990s. The taxes would 
have cost the poorest households 2.5 per cent of their income while it 
would have cost the richest households only 1.1 per cent of their income. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.3: Carbon Taxes (Permit Costs) as Per Cent of Household 
Income 
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This is illustrative of the kind of burden that tradable emissions 
permits would also impose. However, if the permits were auctioned (or 
carbon taxes levied) then the revenue would be available to the 
government to offset the excess burden falling on poor households. 
However, if there is no revenue because the permits are “grandparented”, 
then the poorest households would suffer while the owners of the existing 
polluting firms would receive a windfall gain from the state. 
The fact that poor households spend a higher proportion of their 
income on energy makes them more vulnerable to the inevitable rise in 
costs that action on global warming will entail. This situation also prevails 
in the UK (Smith, 1992). However, for some countries, such as Norway 
(Birkelund et al., 1993) the opposite may be the case. Thus there is no EU 
norm on how these measures are likely to affect economies and who is 
likely to carry the ultimate cost of necessary adjustment. 
Effects on Specific Sectors and Companies 
Any action on global warming, whether it be in the form of emissions 
trading or carbon taxation, will inevitably lead to higher costs of pollution. 
This will have an asymmetric impact across sectors, with energy-intensive 
sectors being relatively worse off. A report commissioned by IBEC’s 
Climate Change Working Group considered the competitiveness 
implications of an increase in energy prices (Boyle, 2000). They 
constructed an index of energy costs as a percentage of the value of gross 
output. In 1997, while most sectors had a ratio of under 2 per cent 
implying a low degree of energy cost sensitivity, over 40 sectors had a ratio 
in excess of 2 per cent. In the same year, these sectors accounted for 16 
per cent of industrial turnover, 27 per cent of industrial employment, 75 
per cent of industrial energy use by value and 28 per cent of the industrial 
wage and salary bill.  
It is possible to identify the five sectors that will be most affected by 
environmental policy, each with an energy cost ratio in excess of 10 per 
cent: 
1. Production and Distribution of Electricity. 
2. Manufacture of cement, lime and plaster, plaster products for 
construction purposes, mortars, fibre cement and other articles of 
concrete, plaster and cement. 
3. Manufacture of basic precious and non-ferrous metals. 
4. Manufacture of bricks, tiles and construction products in baked clay. 
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5. Manufacture of basic iron and steel and of ferro-alloys (ECSC), tubes; 
other first processing of iron and steel and productions on non-ECSC 
ferro-alloys. 
Three of the above sectors are not very tradable internationally 
(electricity, manufacture of cement etc, and manufacture of bricks etc.). 
Assuming a tradable emissions policy is implemented on an EU-wide basis 
they would not be disadvantaged relative to other firms in the EU. The 
size and weight of the products produced by two of these sectors implies 
that it would not be attractive to relocate production in a country outside 
the EU, and export to Ireland. However, the other two sectors are 
internationally tradable, and the substantial increase in energy costs will 
prove problematic for them. Given the small size of the domestic market 
and the openness of the Irish economy, it is likely that the price elasticity 
of demand for these products will be quite high. Hence, if firms attempt to 
reflect the increase in energy costs with higher product prices, they will 
lose market share. Obviously, there is a limit to the magnitude of profit 
loss that firms will accept, and they will be left with the choice of 
relocating production to a country not covered by environmental 
regulation, or ceasing production altogether. Under these circumstances it 
could be necessary, with EU agreement, to extend special treatment to 
these sectors in the recycling of revenues, which was not taken into 
account in the IBEC study. 
It is necessary to indicate that a few firms selling on an international 
market would require exemption or compensation. However, just because 
a firm is a heavy energy user does not warrant special treatment. The issue 
is whether a sector or a firm faces serious competition from firms located 
outside the EU in locations where measures are not likely to be taken to 
deal with the global warming problem. However, such exemptions or 
compensations are likely to breach EU competition law, and it may prove 
difficult to obtain authorisation for these schemes.  
It is too early to say how the distribution of income within farming 
might be affected by measures directed at that sector. What is clear is that 
many of the farms that are currently producing cattle already have low 
incomes and there remains the possibility that their incomes might rise if 
the appropriate incentive structure were put in place and they were able to 
shift production to alternative products offering superior returns. 
If an emissions trading regime were introduced on a purely domestic 
basis, the competition implications would potentially be severe. In the 
current Irish situation over 40 per cent of carbon emissions come from the 
ESB and a very few other major firms. If emission rights were 
“grandparented” then, without trade, there would be no possibility of new 
entrants to the electricity-generation market and entry to other markets, 
such as cement, could also be restricted. Even if the quotas are auctioned 
and there is a possibility of trade, within the very restricted Irish market 
there still remains the “Bunker Hunt” possibility.23 It could well be 
worthwhile for incumbents to pay over the odds for emission rights 
because, in so doing, they could prevent new entry into the market.  
 
23 Bunker Hunt tried to capture the world market in silver in the early 1970s in an attempt to 
drive up prices  
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As discussed above, in the Irish context, the appropriate level at 
which to restrict emissions is likely to be the producers and importers of 
primary energy – the oil companies, BGE, the ESB, Bord na Mona etc. 
However, given the small size of the market and the distribution of trade 
across the existing major importers and producers, our conclusion is that it 
would not be possible to have a regime of tradable quotas purely restricted 
to an Irish market. So long as the limited number of market participants 
knew that the auction would involve a fixed total amount of quotas, there 
would remain the likelihood that, as well as restricting emissions, the 
regime would limit competition, with a potential serious additional 
unnecessary loss of welfare to the community. 
The reason why such a quota regime potentially gives rise to anti-
competitive practices is that the publicly available knowledge that the 
quota is fixed allows market participants to know that they can “corner” 
the market. Under a regime based on carbon taxes, where the state sets the 
tax and allows any quantity of emissions, provided that the tax is paid, it is 
not possible to “corner” the market – the market is open-ended. The best 
safeguard against such anti-competitive practices is to make the market 
sufficiently large that no individual player can afford to “corner” the 
market.  
The situation will be very different if the regime involves a 
simultaneous introduction of EU wide (or world-wide) tradable emissions 
permits. This could involve either trading between governments or trading 
by authorised individual legal entities (such as importers or producers of 
primary energy). By extending the pool of potential traders, the potential 
for a small number of individuals to capture the market would be greatly 
reduced.  
In addition, by greatly increasing the number of players, the liquidity 
of the market would also be improved. In a purely Irish market, to ensure 
availability of adequate quotas over the full 2008 to 2012 period, many 
firms might feel that they would have to overbuy quota to ensure that they 
could meet all future eventualities. In a much larger and more liquid 
market firms would know that they could buy and sell quota as needed; 
there would always be sellers and buyers. 
However, even at the EU level, there would be some substantial 
firms, such as the oil majors and some major energy utilities, which would 
be significant players in the market. As a result, there would probably still 
be some concern about dangers to competition and market liquidity. In 
particular, if the regime involved permits to emit which must be exercised 
within a certain time-scale (e.g. 2008 to 2012), the period coming up to the 
end of the regime could see possible disruption as a result of unexpected 
tightening (or weakening) of the market for permits. 
Apart from the dangers of market dominance there is also an 
important issue relating to whether permits are auctioned or 
“grandparented”. Where they are auctioned throughout the EU the 
common market will ensure that all firms pay the same price. However, if 
some countries “grandparent”, or otherwise exempt particular industrial 
sectors or firms, this could operate as a very significant state aid. Such a 
development could prove a serious distortion to trade and seriously 
damage the single EU market. Thus it would seem important that where 
auctions are not the preferred allocation mechanism (or exemptions are 
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granted), at an early stage in the implementation within the EU of the 
Kyoto protocol, state aid guidelines should be agreed that guard against 
this possibility. 
 
 There is a popular misconception about a tax based regime to control 
carbon emissions that it would involve higher prices for consumers and 
businesses than a quota based regime. As outlined above, a regime where 
quotas are required to import or produce primary energy and where these 
permits themselves are auctioned, would appear identical to a tax based 
regime for all households and all but a tiny minority of businesses. The 
cost of buying permits would be passed on to consumers and businesses in 
just the same way that the cost of taxes is. This is apparent in the case of 
excise taxes on oil where the vast bulk of consumers, businesses or 
households, just see higher prices. They never need be aware that the 
Customs and Excise authorities exist. Thus for nearly all economic agents 
the choice of regime will not be of any direct significance to them in their 
daily lives. 
A regime in which the quotas applied to emissions in an individual 
year would appear very similar to a tax regime. In both cases there would 
be a substantial payment to the State and in both cases the cost of this 
payment would be paid in higher prices to final consumers of energy. 
However, there would be some significant differences: 
• In the quota regime there would be a reasonable certainty of achieving 
a precise target reduction in emissions within a particular year. In the 
case of a tax regime, uncertainty about the precise response of the 
economy in a particular year to a change in price (tax) would make it 
difficult to hit the target exactly. Depending on the penalties to be 
imposed for overshooting on emissions in a particular year, it might 
be necessary to aim to continually undershoot through raising taxes. 
However, the margin of error from one year to another is unlikely to 
be very great and, over a five year period it should be possible to 
approach a target level of emissions reasonably precisely through 
varying tax rates at least once or twice over the period. 
• The administration for excise taxes is already in place, well understood 
and cheap to run. The administrative costs of any quota regime are 
likely to be higher, not just because it is new, but because of the need 
to develop and supervise a market in emission rights. The compliance 
costs for participants – the costs of making the market work – are also 
likely to be much higher than for an excise tax regime. 
• Under a quota regime there will always be the danger that major 
players may be able to use undue market power. However, by 
providing some flexibility in the regime, making it impossible to 
“corner the market”, the danger could be significantly reduced. 
Leaving aside the costs of administering and participating in any 
policy to reduce emissions and the potential for market distortions, for a 
given reduction in emissions, the cost to consumers (businesses and 
households) will be similar whether a tax or a quota regime is used. 
 
 
3.5  
An Alternative 
Eco-Tax 
Solution 
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The problem of global warming by its nature requires a multilateral co-
operative solution. Despite the apparent breakdown in the multilateral 
agreement arrived at in Kyoto, due to the declared intention of the US not 
to ratify the Protocol, the European Union seems intent on pursuing “early 
action” by continuing with the agreed emission reduction targets. While 
Ireland has been given what appears to be a softer constraint than most 
other EU member states, reflecting its stage of development, the rapid 
economic growth during the last decade has meant that emissions of 
greenhouse gases have already greatly exceeded the target. The 
reconciliation of economic growth with environmental sustainability poses 
a significant challenge at any stage of development, but it is quite 
pronounced in Ireland at this juncture (see Clinch, 2001).  
Sharing the burden of international action need not necessarily be 
viewed as a negative cost for Ireland, but rather as an opportunity to 
pursue policies that enhance the economy’s competitiveness, a critical 
determinant of living standards for a small open economy. International 
obligations have allowed desirable domestic policy actions to be 
undertaken. Examples include the liberalisation of markets under the EU 
Single Market and the prudent medium-term focus now given to fiscal 
policy as part of the single currency project. It is important for a country of 
Ireland’s size not to behave King Canute-like in trying to stop the waves 
but go with the flow.  
The flow internationally is moving towards tradable permits as a 
mechanism to achieve emission reductions. This is a departure from the 
price based, environmental tax approach advocated for over a decade in 
Europe, and in particular in Ireland by the ESRI. This, however, is not a 
radical departure but is rather swapping one type of market mechanism 
approach for another. Indeed these need not even be mutually exclusive 
approaches in practice, but for now a modest introduction of the proposal 
on permit trading would seem most fitting. 
It is important that any scheme of tradable emissions permits be 
introduced on at least an EU-wide basis. An independent Irish scheme 
could seriously damage competition in important markets within Ireland. 
Such an international scheme should apply only to importers or producers 
of primary energy as it would be very inefficient to require all businesses to 
participate in such a market. It is important that any trading regime should 
cover all sectors of the economy. However, special provision would be 
needed for sectors that are both very energy intensive and face serious 
international competition. It is important that the tradable permits be sold 
rather than given away (“grandparented”). The revenue can then be used 
to reduce other taxes and to ensure that poor households, that may be 
adversely affected by an emissions trading regime, are effectively 
compensated.  
Early mover advantages can accrue to national permit trading systems 
in influencing the design of the advocated pan-European trading system 
and by giving domestic firms the opportunity in a transition period to 
configure activities appropriately. If the required actions are part of a “no 
regrets” strategy, that is the adjustments were worth pursuing for other 
reasons anyhow, then this approach is a limited risk one. The main 
concerns will relate to the distribution of the costs and benefits but also to 
the impact on the economy’s competitiveness. These are not 
3.6 
Conclusions 
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insurmountable constraints with careful design and implementation of a 
sensible emission reductions policy (Bohm, 1999).  
Changing behaviour is the key to success of any policy intervention. 
Even the advocates of a “wait and see” approach as part of a policy of 
optimal inertia realise that there comes a time when decisive action is 
desirable. Such a time may be upon us in Ireland to trade in the old model 
and start anew with a tradable permits approach. However, as this paper 
has tried to highlight there are issues that need more research before any 
radical departure is undertaken. 
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4. HOUSEHOLD INCOME 
EFFECTS AND 
IMPLEMENTATION OPTIONS 
Sue Scott and John Eakins24 
 Market-based policies to protect the environment have not been widely 
applied in Ireland. At a time of high levels of construction and investment 
in equipment, the opportunities foregone could be sizeable. The regulatory 
regime is helping to promote the adoption of environment-friendly 
technologies but there is considerable scope for reform of the fiscal 
system25 and for applying the polluter pays principle in order to rectify the 
incentives. In the absence of correct incentives, the regulatory regime 
operates in an unsupportive environment. It is not possible to regulate 
every micro-decision and it is likely that new equipment and buildings 
embodying sub-optimal technology are being installed alongside 
reinforcement of inappropriate lifestyles and habits. 
A possible reason for slow adoption of market-based instruments is 
concern for distributional issues, that is, the effects on household incomes 
and particularly on households with low incomes. If we take the example 
of a road-pricing trial in Dublin, two disadvantages of this market-based 
option were strongly perceived. These were that such a measure would be 
“unfair to the less well-off” and “an additional tax” (O’Mahony et al., 
2000). When recommending market-based policies therefore, one should 
think carefully about the results for different income groups, that is, the 
so-called distributional consequences, and how to adjust the tax burden 
overall.  
Various distributional issues have been investigated by the OECD 
(1995, 1996), Scott (1992, 1996), Barker and Köhler (1998) and van 
Humbeeck (2000), for example. However, measures to address the issues 
could benefit from more focused investigation. Revenues from 
environmental taxes and charges accrue to general government for 
redistribution in some chosen manner, but if the final impact increases 
 
24 Sue Scott is a Senior Research Officer and Head of the Environment Policy Research 
Centre and John Eakins is a Research Assistant at The Economic and Social Research 
Institute  The authors wish to thank Brenda Gannon for her assistance in preparing the data 
and for her advice  They are also grateful to Paul Herrington for his comments on the tables 
of household water consumption and for making available his calculations for the UK  
25  EPA (2000), Barrett et al  (1997)  
4.1 
Introduction 
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inequality we will call this result regressive. This paper looks at the options 
for avoiding or offsetting any regressive effects that would result from the 
introduction of market-based instruments. 
For illustrative purposes, the paper uses three examples of market-
based instruments for protecting the environment that are under 
discussion to a greater or lesser extent. The examples are (1) carbon taxes 
(or tradable permits), (2) charges for household waste disposal and (3) 
water service charges. The paper proceeds as follows. The next section 
describes for each example in turn the distributional effects on households 
in different income groups and any special issues arising. The third section 
looks at means for offsetting the adverse distributional effects. The paper 
concludes with final comments. 
It is important to note that we are not talking about policies that 
would constitute additional taxes but, rather, about reassigning the take 
from one to replace another. These three examples therefore do not 
constitute an extra tax. The policies would be broadly revenue-neutral, 
compared to the baseline or business-as-usual policy. For example, the 
carbon tax could replace some other tax, and the environmental service 
charges could be associated with a reduction in the Exchequer provision to 
local authorities and hence in income taxes, for example. The final 
outcome is not a rise in taxation overall; instead, one form of tax or 
payment is replaced by another that is designed to improve the structure of 
incentives. 
 
 It is assumed that we want to avoid a policy that is regressive, that is, 
where the financial effects leave poor households relatively worse off. A 
preferred policy is assumed to be one where the overall result is either 
neutral in its effects on different income groups, or possibly progressive. A 
policy that leaves everybody better off but leaves society more unequal is 
still described here as being regressive. 
4.2.1 CARBON TAXES 
As is well known, the effects of carbon taxes implemented on their own 
are regressive. Estimates from an early study are reproduced in Figure 4.1, 
which shows the amounts of carbon tax that would be paid under the 
European Commission’s original proposal in 1991 for a carbon tax, set at 
$10 per barrel of oil equivalent. The descending line gives the tax as a 
percentage of the household budget (using the right hand side axis). Low-
income households would have found themselves paying in the region of 
an extra 2½ per cent on top of their weekly budget, compared to about an 
extra 1 per cent by the top income group. Publication shortly of the 
1999/2000 Household Budget Survey will allow new estimates to be made. 
These effects would not in fact  materialise  fully until 
Figure 4.1: Effects on Households in Various Income Groups of the 
EC’s Original Carbon Tax Proposal of 1991, 
(implemented on its own, that is, without considering 
the respending of government revenue) 
4.2 
Distributional 
Effects Outlined  


64 GREEN AND BEAR IT 
 
 
Source: Barker and Köhler, 1998  
Note: The horizontal axis shows household groups classified according to their expenditure, 
expressed as a share of average national expenditure   
 
The authors note that:  
…. every expenditure group in every member state in the analysis benefits from 
the tax shift, with the extent of the benefit ranging from the lowest of 0.01 per 
cent for real personal disposable income in households with under 0.4 of the 
mean expenditures in Spain to the highest of 4.17 per cent for the highest 
expenditure group in Belgium.  
However, although all groups gain, the authors call the outcome 
“weakly regressive”, in so far as low-income and vulnerable groups benefit 
less than the average of all households and income disparities are 
increased.  
4.2.2 DISTRIBUTIONAL EFFECTS OF DOMESTIC REFUSE 
CHARGES 
Domestic refuse services are partially subsidised but charges are 
increasingly being imposed and more of the undertakings are being 
contracted to private operators. About a third in 1995 and now just under 
half of the eighty-eight authorities with responsibility for refuse have sub-
contracted to private operators. A further 16 have mixed private and 
authority-operated services. Only in about a third of authorities is the 
service now provided by the authority alone (Curtis, 2001). 
Volume-related charging, in the form of a charge per bag or per tag, 
has become more widespread with some twenty-six authorities charging in 
this manner. Eighteen of these twenty-six volume-related charging 
schemes are privately operated, four are mixed private/authority operated 
and only four are operated by the authority alone. In other areas, the 
charging regime consists solely of a flat fee (thirty-seven authorities), and 
the service is provided “free” by three authorities. In some areas there is a 
fee per 240-litre bin and fees may be differentiated by bin size; but this is 
not likely to be common.  
A preliminary analysis of volume-related charging was undertaken by 
Lawlor (1996) and a “before and after” study of the effects of weight-
based charging, funded by the EPA, is underway at present by Barrett and 
Curtis (forthcoming).  
This forthcoming analysis will advance the discussion but, as of now, 
the picture can be characterised as one in which the majority of 
households are charged an effective flat-rate annual fee, and a volume 
related fee or nothing at all is charged on the rest. Though subject to a 
wide range, flat-rate fees cluster in the region of £100 to £135 per year. 
The flat-rate fee is obviously regressive, representing 1 per cent or more of 
net household income for quintile 2 and but a quarter of that for the 
highest group. A zero charge, by comparison, may be progressive in so far 
as payment through the tax system could be viewed as progressive. With 
local authorities now increasingly having to fund their refuse operations, 
the regressive effects could therefore worsen. 
The point to be made here is that costs are going to rise. As landfills 
are operated to higher standards and with increased recycling by the 
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authorities, costs per household could rise to a sum closer to £200 per 
year. This would be nearer to 2 per cent of quintile 2’s net income and less 
than a half per cent of the top quintile’s. 
If the service were charged for by volume, households would 
increasingly compost vegetable waste and take recyclables to recycle banks, 
thereby reducing their bills by perhaps a third. That of course is one of the 
major benefits of volume-related charging and its chief raison d’être. By 
contrast annual flat-fees do not give a reward or incentive to people to 
reduce the amount of waste they generate. Table 4.1 shows what people 
themselves think is the best way to pay for domestic refuse services, when 
they are presented with the financing options. The question was put to 
them in a survey undertaken at the end of 2000 and it replicated the 
question posed in a survey undertaken in 1993. Appendix 4.1 gives the 
question and it can be seen from the wording that respondents were thus 
given realistic choices as to how the increased costs of improvements in 
methods of waste disposal and other services could be paid for.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.1:  Chosen Method of Paying for the Service Dealing with 
Household Garbage 
Method of Paying 1993 Survey 2000 Survey 
Increase in taxes 3 13 
Fixed service charge 53 38 
Charge for amount  44 45 
“No charge, government should pay” - 4 
TOTAL 100 100 
Number of respondents 925 1,176 
Sources: ESRI (1994, 2000)  
 
It appears that “charging based on the amount” is now the most 
favoured method of charging though still not favoured by a majority, as 
Table 4.1 shows. Despite this being the preferred method, there is also a 
rise in the small numbers preferring an increase in taxes. This may reflect 
the recognition that general taxation could be a more progressive method 
of payment, that it could avoid fly-tipping which would otherwise need to 
be policed or, recognition by the people who have now been moved out of 
the tax net, that general taxation could mean payment by “somebody else”. 
Additionally, a small group insisted that the interviewers record an 
additional category of response, namely that “government should pay”.  
4.2.3 DISTRIBUTIONAL EFFECTS OF DOMESTIC WATER 
CHARGES 
Domestic water charges are barely on the agenda at present. However, 
several documents underline the future importance of water as an issue 
which would suggest that options on how water services are financed 
should be kept open.  
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For example, in the Millennium Report the EPA points to the possibility 
that increasing water supply infrastructure:  
…. may have adverse effects on the aquatic environment, e.g., inundation of 
land to form reservoirs, changes in the flow regime in rivers below dams and 
deterioration of water quality below the discharges from sewage treatment 
plants. 
Meanwhile, the supply of water could possibly undergo changes, though 
more with respect to the pattern of supply rather than to the actual 
quantity. The National Climate Change Strategy (Department of the 
Environment and Local Government, 2000) describes potential impacts of 
global warming as being likely to include:  
Significant increases in winter rainfall, .... lower summer rainfall causing 
regular water shortages especially in the midlands, east and north, and 
affecting both people and eco-systems. There would be less recharge of 
reservoirs during the summer; water shortages would occur regularly and 
would be longer than at present.29 
Recently in their environmental performance review of Ireland, 
OECD (2000) recommended progressive application of the  
User-Pays and Polluter-Pays Principles to water pricing policy concerning 
both households and economic sectors, taking account of social and 
distributive concerns.  
Given all these prompts, it would seem prudent to give some thought 
to the issue in the secure knowledge that it will come on to the agenda 
eventually, as happened with carbon taxes, first addressed ten years ago.  
As is well known, domestic water service charges were abolished at 
the start of 1997. The diversity of the charging regime, the unaddressed 
difficulties it posed to some families and the absence of incentive to 
careful use of water meant that these charges were in need of reform in 
any case (Scott and Lawlor, 1997). What transpired, however, was 
complete abolition of domestic charges, with the funding shortfall 
eventually made good by other revenues including funds from central 
government. 
Metered charging gives an incentive to careful water use thereby 
reducing costs overall. It is worth considering what the distributional 
pattern of metered charges would be if they operated for domestic water 
services at present.30 A difficulty is that information on water use is sparse 
at present. A feature of domestic water consumption is that use per head 
declines with increasing numbers of inhabitants in the household. A recent 
survey of 1,768 households by Anglian Water revealed the pattern 
illustrated in Figure 4.3. The graph shows actual water use only, with losses 
on the customer’s premises excluded. Some of the households faced 
metered charges and their consumption can be seen to be below that of 
 
29 Other potential results are that the “change in rainfall patterns could cause regular water 
deficits in peatlands Increased agricultural production, with new crops becoming viable 
and agricultural production costs reduced if prolonged summer droughts do not become a 
problem Some existing forestry species may suffer (e g  where availability of water and 
nitrogen are limiting factors), with others becoming more productive "  
30 A discussion of the costs and benefits of metering and of the methodology for analysing 
the metering option is given in Scott (2001)   
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Method of paying 1993 Survey 2000 Survey 
Increase in taxes 2 12 
Fixed service charge 51 26 
Charge for amount used 46 56 
“No charge, government should pay” - 6 
TOTAL 100 100 
Number of respondents 919 1,176 
Source: ESRI (1994, 2000)  
 
Figure 4.4: Hypothetical Annual Bill for Water Services Broken 
Down by Household Income Groups and Expressed as 
a Proportion of Net Income 
Note: Magnitudes are based on consumption figures derived for the UK and are illustrative 
only  
 
Again the option of increasing taxes is unpopular though its share 
rises to 18 per cent if one includes the response “government should pay”. 
The option of charging by amount appears by contrast to be the preferred 
method, and by a majority. Results of two surveys cannot be decisive but 
the views merit some consideration. Current costs alone of supplying water 
services to households have been estimated at very approximately £122 
million per year. In the light of likely future rises in demands and of 
increased costs, commercial criteria have a role to play in water resource 
allocation, alongside due regard for social and distributional concerns. It is 
true that in the past, when water was cheap to supply and demand 
pressures were less, commercial considerations weighed less heavily in 
public and official thinking.  
In the same vein, Ireland insisted that the wording in Article 9 of the 
EU Water Framework Directive would allow an opt-out from the 
requirement of full cost recovery of water services by sector by 2010 (EC, 
2000). However, if Ireland could meet the social and distributional 
concerns and implement charging, not necessarily within the specified 
timeframe, then our opt-outs “could be saved” for other causes.  
We have now looked at three examples of market-based policies, in 
the fields of global warming, refuse and water services. In the case of 
global warming, the weakly regressive effects were noted of the carbon tax 
with revenue recycling to reduce employers’ social security contributions. 
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In the cases of the two environmental services, the strongly regressive 
nature of implementing the charges on their own was described. Our 
attention now turns to the options for mitigating these effects.  
 
 
 Bearing in mind that incentives to good environmental behaviour should 
ideally be maintained, it would be useful to see if the option of waiving 
taxes and charges can be avoided. Ultimately, society will benefit from the 
“educational” role played by such charges, and ideally everyone should 
benefit from this role and not be unfamiliar with charging regimes if their 
financial circumstances improve or when they are confronted by charging 
abroad. Taking stock of the discussion so far, all three examples of market-
based instruments provide revenue to, or save expenditure by, general 
government. The adequacy of means for compensation is not in question. 
These instruments can be seen as an opportunity for replacing (part of) 
some other tax which, unlike the proposed environmental tax or charge, 
might be economically distorting.  
No revenue would arise however in the case of a policy that allocated 
grandfathered emissions permits, that is, free of charge (see the previous 
paper by Fitz Gerald et al., in this volume). That policy would be markedly 
regressive because in addition to causing price rises similar to those 
resulting from carbon taxes, company shareholders would become owners 
of valuable permits. Leaving aside this example, what are the options for 
alleviating regressive effects? 
The options and the issues arising can be described under the 
following headings, which start at the macro level and progress to options 
at micro level. 
1. Reducing or altering indirect taxes. The desired reduction in regressive 
effects could be achieved by reducing other regressive taxes, such as 
VAT. Reductions in VAT may not counteract the regressivity 
sufficiently, though they could be helpful in the case of households 
where incomes were below or close to the tax threshold and which 
could not benefit from income tax cuts.  
 
2. Increasing income tax thresholds, or reducing rates of tax on low 
incomes would confer benefits on low-income households, and also 
on high-income households. Allowing the environmental charge 
against income tax at the standard rate, as for refuse charges at 
present, can have roughly similar effects. Non-tax payers would not be 
able to benefit, however. Selective reduction of social security 
contributions of low-income labour would counteract regressivity. 
Reductions in social security contributions were already part of the 
package in the carbon tax analyses described above, but there may be 
scope for differentiated reductions.  
 
3. An equal lump-sum amount returned to each household, 
corresponding to the value of the average environmental tax or charge, 
could be an effective means of offsetting regressive effects of eco-
taxes and charges. Lump-sum returns are sometimes held up as the 
textbook “ideal” way to compensate. This is partly because low-
 
4.3 
Options for 
Offsetting 
Regressive 
Effects of 
Economic 
Instruments 
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income households consume less energy and environmental services 
so that lump-sum compensation leaves them more than compensated, 
in contrast with high-income households which are less than fully 
compensated. It would guarantee to remove regressive effects. The 
disadvantage is that the economic benefits of reducing distorting taxes 
such as labour taxes are then foregone. But while foregoing this 
benefit, there may be practical advantages to allocating some of the 
funds as lump-sum returns if addressing income distribution in a 
visible way is more important than removing tax distortions.  
 The recent replacement of income tax allowances by tax credits 
offers just such an opportunity for lump-sum compensation, though a 
mechanism for awarding credits to low-income households with 
incomes below or close to the tax threshold would still be needed. Of 
the 1,769,000 people on income tax records, 668,000 are exempt from 
tax. They present a difficulty because they cannot benefit from a tax 
credit at present and the number of exemptions has increased of late 
as policy has aimed to reduce the numbers paying tax.  
 An extended version of the Family Income Supplement could 
be a vehicle for compensating these people. Better still might be a 
system of awarding “refundable tax credits”, currently being examined 
by a special Working Group set up under the Programme for 
Prosperity and Fairness. Under a refundable tax credit system some 
benefits could be administered by the tax system rather than by the 
welfare system. This would mean that those who did not have enough 
tax liabilities to make use of a tax credit would see their tax liability 
become negative, and receive a payment from the authorities.31 
Experience elsewhere has shown that there may be some advantages 
to such an innovation. By its comprehensiveness it would certainly 
ease the task of offsetting the regressive effects of economic 
instruments and it would be an ideal vehicle for lump-sum 
compensation. 
 In some instances the lump-sum compensation would be more 
appropriate if it were awarded per head, rather than per household or 
family. It would then be necessary to know the numbers of persons in 
the household and this information might not be readily to hand to 
the relevant organisation. The electoral register and the children’s 
allowance books would go a long way to supplying the information 
but gaps in information spring to mind – for example children aged 
16 and 17 who have left education and no longer qualify for the 
allowance nor for inclusion on the electoral register. (The example 
below of the water tariff operating in Flanders requires this 
information on numbers in the household.) 
 
4. The social welfare system can be called upon in the normal way that it 
deals with rises in the costs of living. Pensions, unemployment benefit, 
family income supplement for those in work, et cetera, can be raised to 
compensate households. An example that was successful a decade ago 
was the introduction of the smokeless fuel allowance for Dublin. This 
 
31 Callan et al. (2001)  
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compensated households in cash for the increased costs of smokeless 
coal compared to smoky coal. The difference in the case of the 
introduction of economic instruments under discussion here is, first, 
one of much larger scale and, secondly, the government would have 
the money to hand to finance the increase in social welfare 
expenditure.  
The various options considered so far are measures that the 
government can introduce, through the tax system alone, through 
integration of the tax and social welfare system, or through the social 
welfare system on its own. There are other measures that are more 
closely focussed on specific aspects or that involve structuring the 
charge or tax in a particular way, as follows. 
 
5. Subsidies to improve “technical performance” that helps the 
economic instrument to achieve its aim. For example measures aimed 
at the homes of the elderly or less well-off can have multiple benefits. 
Measures could include home insulation, supply of compost bins or 
repair of water-leakage in the home. The possibilities here are 
numerous and some are already in operation to some degree. 
 
6. In the case of environmental services, the tariff structure can be 
manipulated to be progressive. The supplier can reduce the fixed cost 
element or a portion of it, where there is such a cost. However 
difficulties can arise if pricing principles depart from the underlying 
economic realities of the supply process. Neither should there be a 
bonanza to the supplier if the supplier is in turn compensated by 
government. 
 
7. An option is to levy no charges on people below a certain threshold 
income. In case this risks creating a “poverty trap” whereby people are 
discouraged from seeking work in order to maintain their benefits, an 
alternative is to impose a cap on the amount that households on 
certain welfare payments would pay for an environmental service. The 
government can require companies/utilities to operate this special 
tariff. In the case of uncompensated private companies, cross-
subsidising by other customers would be required to make up the 
shortfall. In the UK, for example water customers pay an extra 50 
pence per year to finance the waiver or cap granted to low-income 
customers. Unfortunately, waivers and caps could discourage the 
adoption of good environmental habits on the part of recipients and 
should be avoided. 
 
8. With volume-based charging, the burden of the charge can be 
alleviated by granting a free amount of the service to all, like a given 
weight of rubbish removal or volume of water per head. In Flanders, 
for example, 40 litres of water per head per day is given free, which is 
under 30 per cent of average daily consumption. The costs of this 
allowance are made good by a rise in the volumetric price of supplies 
above this threshold. Efficiency and equity are met to some extent. 
The free allowance has the virtue of being small enough to ensure that 
few households will face a zero price, so there is still an incentive for 
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careful use. It covers a certain core water need in the home and it is 
fair by being allocated per head (van Humbeeck, 2000). Well-
considered schemes would still be required to assist the most 
vulnerable, however. 
 
9. The most vulnerable would include those that are special cases, such 
as people with medical conditions that require extra energy use, water 
services or whatever. These special cases are already catered for in 
other contexts and should simply be extended to deal with 
environmental taxes/charges. Careful advance preparation must be 
undertaken. 
Two general issues that could arise merit discussion here. One is the 
question of whether benefits in cash are better than benefits in kind. A 
benefit in kind that is surplus to what the household would choose to 
purchase if it had the equivalent amount of money, renders it less well off 
than it would be if it had received the money equivalent instead. This has 
been called “unpreferred expenditure” if by dint of having the money 
instead, the household would have been able to buy some different, 
preferred, purchases (Conniffe, 2000). (The household would then have 
been on a higher indifference curve.) There are arguments for benefits in 
kind, depending on the circumstances, and benefits in kind do play a role 
in the alleviation of poverty (Nolan and Russell, 2001) but benefits in cash 
are preferable. Allowing households no choice as to how they spend the 
money insures that it is spent on the item in question, but it also implies 
that the inhabitants should not have options. If benefits in kind are used, 
such as the free fuel schemes, it is important that they be as flexible as 
possible, in terms of fuel type and timing of use, et cetera, and reviewed 
carefully. 
The second issue concerns public versus private supply. Whether the 
item subject to the environmental tax/charge is privately or publicly 
supplied is in theory immaterial. The free electricity scheme can still 
operate with a privatised ESB. In practice, the costs to low-income families 
of private services tend not to be subvented. In the UK, for example, rules 
have been drawn up by the water regulator and government on how the 
water companies should behave towards vulnerable customers, as a result 
perhaps of bad treatment after privatisation, and there is no subsidy.  
Having sketched the options and considered some issues, we can sum 
up by noting that there are many methods for countering the regressive 
effects. The compensation options that can comprehensively target 
incomes that fall below or close to the tax threshold consist of the social 
welfare system with an extended Family Income Supplement and the tax 
credit or, better still, the refundable tax credit, currently under discussion. 
We turn now to check our three examples of market-based instruments to 
see what could be the appropriate means for compensation in each case. 
4.3.1 COMPENSATION FOR THE EFFECTS OF CARBON 
TAXES (OR AUCTIONED TRADABLE PERMITS) 
A system of tradable permits that are not auctioned would be highly 
regressive without providing government with the means for redressing 
this result. We will set this example aside (Fitz Gerald et al., 2002). 
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Auctioned tradable permits, on the other hand, would have price 
effects that are broadly similar to those arising from a carbon tax. The 
overall effects would be similarly dependent on how the revenues are 
spent.  
Use of revenues from carbon taxes or auctioned permits to fund the 
reduction of  other taxes (other than externality taxes) amounts to 
removing a distortion. With the lower tax rates prevailing at present, the 
benefits of reducing taxes on labour found in the above-mentioned studies 
would be less significant, though it could still be worth doing.32 
The extent and nature of the regressive effects that would result from 
the introduction of carbon taxes would depend on the recycling option 
chosen. However, even in the benign scenario, such as that described by 
Barker and Köhler (1998) where revenue is recycled to reduce employers’ 
social security contributions and social benefits are indexed to wages, the 
results are weakly regressive. That is, though all expenditure groups are 
predicted to gain, income disparities rise. If the rise in disparities were to 
be avoided then intervention would be necessary to counter it. 
The results could be made more progressive by means of the social 
welfare system, which has a regime in place. Fuel allowances, in cash, and 
the Family Income Supplement would be appropriate means. Alternatively, 
if refundable tax credits became an option they could be introduced in a 
tapered way. Many combinations could be considered. It would indeed be 
possible to recycle all revenue in lump-sum compensation if refundable tax 
credits became operational. If lump-sum compensation were the only way 
to make carbon taxes acceptable then the potential benefits of recycling 
through labour taxes might be dispensed with. The lump-sum 
compensation could be set at the national average carbon tax per head (per 
equivalent adult) and paid to everybody by means of the refundable tax 
credit mechanism. The results would be decidedly progressive.  
In addition, certain targeted energy saving measures would be worth 
adopting. The introduction of carbon taxes may in fact be the catalyst that 
brings in a programme to upgrade the housing stock as outlined in the 
National Climate Change Strategy and the Green Paper on Sustainable Energy 
(DELG 2000, DPE 1999). A recent study looked at a possible ten-year 
programme of upgrading the housing stock to the insulation standards of 
new housing. Using “rigorous and conservative estimating techniques” the 
societal benefits were valued at three times the costs with a reduction of 
nearly three million tonnes of annual emissions of CO2 (Brophy et al., 
1999). (As a yardstick, 61 million tonnes of CO2 equivalent in 2008-2012 is 
Ireland’s limit under the Kyoto Protocol.) 
4.3.2 COMPENSATION FOR THE EFFECTS OF CHARGES 
FOR HOUSEHOLD REFUSE 
The 1995 Finance Act introduced an annual income tax relief for 
individuals who pay service charges. In brief, anyone liable to income tax 
can claim up to £150 against tax, depending on the types of charges, at the 
 
32 Analysis of the marginal social cost of the different forms of taxation, in the manner of 
Honohan and Irvine (1987), is needed for determining which taxes are currently the most 
distorting and therefore the best candidates for replacement by eco-taxes  
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standard rate of tax. This amounts to a flat-rate maximum of £30 to the 
household and in recent years some £2 million or so of relief has been 
allowed to about 80,000 persons, giving an average annual relief of about 
£27 per claimant. 
It is surprisingly difficult to discover what procedures were generally 
used to help persons dependent on social welfare or whose incomes are 
too low for them to be able to benefit from the above tax allowance. Some 
local authorities, such as Dublin Corporation, offer a waiver. Others do 
not because the service is provided by a private operator. It was not clear 
what general methods were applied when people under those authorities 
are unable to pay. Perhaps there is recourse to the Health Boards. With the 
projected rise in charges it would be important to know how such cases are 
dealt with from one region to another. The issue is a serious one and needs 
to be addressed in a satisfactory manner otherwise resentment will be 
justifiable.  
It would be helpful to know how the charges impact generally on 
household finances, now and in the future. For example, a major source of 
unfairness has been the absence of charges in some authority areas. It also 
makes a uniform policy of relief less appropriate. An allowance, in the 
manner of the smokeless fuel allowance along with the Family Income 
Supplement granted in selected areas, might suffice. The system of tax 
credits or, more comprehensively, of refundable tax credits would also be 
effective. 
In the last few years, charges have risen and the authorities could 
point to the fact that general taxes have simultaneously gone down. 
Unfortunately, the opportunity was not taken to link the rise in charges to 
the reduction in taxes, or to present this as a “package” or a replacement 
along the lines that people said they wanted.  
4.3.3 COMPENSATION FOR THE INTRODUCTION OF 
METERED CHARGES FOR DOMESTIC WATER 
SERVICES 
The final example is metered charges for domestic water services and 
because this issue has not been described elsewhere this section goes into 
some detail. Water is special. Along with health care it is probably the most 
special of items, if such grading is even appropriate. It goes without saying 
that affordability is a priority. But whether we like it or not, water is an 
economic commodity. Given environmental realities, the costs of meeting 
higher standards and growing demand, the need for efficiency is obvious. 
The way that we pay affects the total we pay and prices should reflect the 
whole truth.  
We saw above the regressive results of the introduction of metered 
water charges. In Figure 4.5 below these are reproduced as the darker line 
(with squares), called “Bill £/yr”. We noted that a lump-sum amount of 
money or tax credit returned to each household, corresponding to the 
value of the average charge, would be very effective in offsetting regressive 
effects.  
It was also noted from Figure 4.3, however, that water use per head is 
higher when there are few household inhabitants. Pensioners and single 
parents for example would be inadequately compensated if average water 
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The discussion centred on three examples of economic instruments, 
namely carbon taxes, charges for refuse and metered charges for water 
services delivered to the domestic sector, all ideally based on the quantity 
of pollution. Each of these examples is regressive if introduced on its own 
without compensating measures. General government would be in pocket 
and therefore in a position to respend the revenues. In deciding how to 
respend, governments have a choice of objectives. On the one hand 
governments can choose to concentrate respending on reducing distorting 
taxes. On the other, they can alleviate the regressive effects to such an 
extent that the result is actually progressive. There is also a range of 
combinations in between to choose from.  
Leaving the choice of objectives aside and concentrating on the 
distributional aim, we saw that there are numerous options for alleviating 
regressive effects, and that even the contentious matter of metered water 
charges could be tackled satisfactorily if we wished. It was pointed out that 
waivers or reduced environmental charges and taxes would not be the best 
method if incentives became blurred as a result. The social welfare 
system’s benefits, preferably in cash rather than in kind, are well suited to 
compensate households that are in the social welfare net. Households that 
are engaged in low paid work are not so easy to target unless the terms of 
the Family Income Supplement were extended. The recently introduced 
system of tax credits brings closer the possibility of awarding lump-sum 
compensation, which would be a simple and progressive way of redressing 
the regressive effects. At present however, this option can only benefit 
those households that are paying tax. Use of the so-called refundable tax 
credits, currently under discussion, would be worth investigating because 
they could comprehensively address the gaps in the current social welfare 
and tax systems. 
Above all it is important to implement environmental charges and 
taxes as a visible “package”, which includes reduction of some existing 
taxes or increases in some receipts. Such an approach would quell the 
“double taxation” criticism of charges. Further consultation of the public, 
with the offer of realistic options, would also be worthwhile. 
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APPENDIX 4.1 
The question on charges in surveys undertaken in 1993 and 2000 was as 
follows: 
“Finally, to meet EU obligations regarding the protection of the 
environment, it will be necessary to improve our methods of waste 
disposal and other services. These improvements will have to paid for, one 
way or another. This may be through higher taxes such as income tax, 
VAT etc., or through fixed service charges on households or by charges 
based on the amount of the service a household or firm uses (for instance, 
by metering water and charging per gallon used. In relation to each of the 
following services, how do you feel it should be paid for?” 
 
 Increases in 
taxes 
Fixed Service 
Charge 
 
Charge for 
amount used 
Supply of drinking water: □ □ □ 
Dealing with household garbage through 
recycling, treatment or disposal: 
 
□ 
 
□ 
 
□ 
 
 
APPENDIX 4.2 
Table A4.1: Numbers in Household and Ownership of Water-Using Appliances, by 
Household Net Income Groups (Quintiles)  
 Quintile 
1 
Quintile 
2 
Quintile 
3 
Quintile 
4 
Quintile 
5 
Average of 
all 
households 
Number of persons per  
 household 
 
1.4038 
 
2.6266 
 
3.3508 
 
3.7428 
 
3.9578 
 
3.0172 
Household net income,  
 £/week 
 
95.31 
 
204.13 
 
339.10 
 
491.13 
 
846.65 
 
395.29 
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Ownership or can avail of 
(% of households): 
      
Washing machine 71.3% 90.5% 97.2% 98.8% 98.9% 91.4% 
Dishwasher 7.7% 18.2% 28.1% 36.3% 56.7% 29.5% 
Indoor flush toilet 92.6% 97.4% 99.6% 99.9% 99.2% 97.7% 
Bath or shower (not shared) 89.4% 96.2% 99.5% 99.9% 100.0% 97.0% 
Source: 1998 Living in Ireland Survey, Dublin: The Economic and Social Research Institute   
Note: The question on ownership was phrased: “Do you own or can you avail of… ”  
Note that the income quintiles are not expressed on the basis of equivalised adults   
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Table A4.2: Provisional Quantities and Current Costs of Water Services (Water Supply and Waste Water) in Ireland, Based on Figures of 
Consumption per Capita from Anglian Water, by Household Net Income Quintiles 
 Quintile 
1 
Quintile 
2 
Quintile 
3 
Quintile 
4 
Quintile  
5 
Average of 
all 
households 
Average numbers of persons per household 1.40 2.63 3.35 3.74 3.96 3.02 
Litres/head/day (provisional estimates) 139 
(162) 
134 
(137) 
131 131 131 
(127) 
132 
Litres/household/day (provisional estimates) 196 353 440 490 519 399 
Annual current cost of  water plus waste water per household, £ £73.90 £112.42 £133.71 £145.83 £153.05 £123.61 
Cost as a proportion of household net income, % 1.5% 1.1% 0.8% 0.6% 0.3% 0.6% 
Litres/head/day for the above household size for all income groups1 221 145 128 123 121 132 
Litres/household/day for the above household size for all income 
groups1 
 
310 
 
381 
 
429 
 
462 
 
478 
 
399 
Tax credit per household £ £101.81 £119.12 £131.03 £138.93 £142.86 £123.61 
Net change per household, £ £27.1 £6.70 -£2.66 -£6.90 -£10.20 £0 
 
Notes: Average numbers in household are taken from Table A4 1  
Use (excluding customer losses) by the average Irish household, which has 3 02 inhabitants, was derived from the relationship between water use and household size shown in Figure 4 3 for unmetered 
households, in the sample from Anglian Water  For the quintiles, ownership of water-using equipment from Table A4 1 was used in conjunction with ownership/usage/volume tables by Herrington 
(1996) to derive water use  Bracketed figures are based on Herrington and are “unadjusted” for Irish conditions  
The current cost per household was calculated, first, for the average of all households by dividing total estimated current costs for domestic water and waste water, approximating £122 million in 1998  
(Scott et al, 2001), by 1 25 million households, and then £26 per household was added for administration  A more correct price would be based on long-run marginal cost (Pearce, 2001)  Costs for 
quintiles were simply calculated pro rata the above litres/household/day, ignoring the potential use of a tariff consisting of several parts  The example is for illustrative purposes only  
1 Based on the relationship between water use (excluding customer losses) and household size shown in Figure 4 3 for all unmetered households (i e  not quintile specific), in the sample from Anglian 
Water  
 81 
5. ACCEPTABILITY AND 
IMPLEMENTATION 
PROBLEMS 
Frank J. Convery33 
 In this paper I explore what might be the factors that drive the adoption 
of environmental taxation in countries in general, and in Ireland in 
particular, with a view to deriving a template of the pre-conditions that 
seem to be necessary if substantive action is to be achieved. In doing so, I 
draw on some of the insights emerging from a research project called 
PETRAS, insights from the literature, and intuition. PETRAS is an EU-
funded research project, co-ordinated by the University of Surrey and has 
partners from Denmark, Germany, the UK, France and Ireland; the 
sequence of this listing is in approximate order of the extent to which 
environmental tax reform (ETR) – defined as an overt attempt to shift 
taxes from labour to environmental degradation – has been embraced. Its 
methodology involves extensive interviews with key policy leaders, business 
interests, and focus groups representative in some sense of the public.34 
Unfortunately, this work is still in progress, so that I can only present the 
hypotheses that are emerging as being plausible. Definitive conclusions are 
yet to be drawn. I also draw on a parallel piece of research being 
undertaken on the fiscal response in Western Europe to the “revolt” against 
higher transport energy taxes, which started in France in October 2000, and 
spread to a number of others. (Convery and McMahon, 2001).  
Much of the discussion is addressed to environmental taxation, but I 
also touch on emissions trading. The factors that appear to inhibit 
acceptability and implementation include the following: governments don’t 
need the money; lack of leadership by the Department of Finance and 
Treasury; antagonistic popular culture reflected in religious ethos; no 
perceived need for tax reform, and specifically, no perceived need for 
reduction in taxation on labour and the existence of the double dividend; 
perception that environmental effectiveness is negligible or ambiguous; 
 
33 Environmental Studies, University College Dublin 
34 The Irish contribution is being led by Louise Dunne as part of her PhD, under the 
supervision of Dr  Peter Clinch, Department of Environmental Studies, UCD, Richview, 
Clonskeagh, Dublin 14  PETRAS website:  
http://www soc surrey ac uk/petras/ 
5.1 
Introduction 
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concerns about impacts on competitiveness and (in the case of carbon tax 
proposals) “Carbon Leakage”; populist culture against “charges” and its 
political saliency; inhospitable political geography – the saliency of public 
environmental sentiment and “the Greens”; absence of economics and 
economists in public administration; lack of “champions”; emphasis on 
investment as the main policy instrument; lack of environmental economics 
research; lack of “market signal” alternatives to taxes and charges; 
inflationary pressures, and need for compliance with the Maastricht criteria; 
high degree of fossil fuel dependency; absence of an industry/business 
lobby in favour of green policies generally, including environmental 
taxation; degree of (dis)trust of government; and finally, ceiling on 
politically viable increases in taxes on transport fuels likely to have been 
reached. Below, I discuss each of these in turn: There is considerable 
variation in the degree to which there is evidence to support the 
proposition posited, and there is an inevitable corresponding asymmetry in 
the extent and quality of the supporting discussion.  
GOVERNMENTS DON’T NEED THE MONEY 
There is some evidence to support this proposition. It seems likely that the 
introduction by the Chancellor for the Exchequer in the UK of the “fuel 
tax escalator” owed more to financial need than to environmental concern. 
German unwillingness to reduce taxes on petrol after the “October 2000 
rebellion” seems to owe something to the fact that the revenues were 
needed to reduce social insurance taxes on labour. (Convery and McMahon, 
2001). The Irish reluctance to implement environmental tax reform is also 
consistent with this proposition. 
LACK OF LEADERSHIP BY THE DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE 
AND TREASURY 
In most countries that adopt a “green tax strategy”, the department of 
Finance/Treasury is a key mover and player. The Treasury in UK (Norman 
Glass et al.), Environmental Tax unit (Jan van der Vaart) in The 
Netherlands, Thorvald Moe in the Ministry of Finance in Norway have all 
been crucial enthusiasts, albeit often with very different philosophies. Lack 
of success of tax reform in France may be a product in part of antipathy by 
the Ministry of Finance. This pre-requisite applies not only to developed 
countries. In Chile, the introduction of emissions trading to address 
particulate air pollution in Santiago was “driven” by the interest and 
commitment of H. Bucci, then – circa 1990 – Minister for Treasury 
(Convery and Katz, 2002). 
However, this does not seem to be an absolute pre-requisite. Green 
tax reform in Germany was not “driven” by the Ministry of Finance, but it 
did, as we shall see later on, have a pro eco-tax lobby, and a political force 
in favour. 
ANTAGONISTIC POPULAR CULTURE, REFLECTED IN 
RELIGIOUS ETHOS 
In an interview with Peter Conrad in The Observer Review Section, (6th May, 
2001) the great Finnish Soprano Karita Mattila is quoted as saying: In 
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Finland, I was brought up to think that anything which gave  you  pleasure must  be  
bad.   This  spirit  of  suffering  as  an 
 
Table 5.1: Excise Duties (US$ per 1000 litres) and VAT (Percent) on Mineral Oils, EU and 
Japan, 1st January 1998. 
Country Unleaded 
Petrol 
Diesel Diesel for 
Industrial Use 
Heating 
Gas Oil 
VAT rate 
(%) 
Religious Affiliation 
European 
Union 
      
Austria 444  308  308  75  20 Roman Catholic (84%) 
Belgium 539  317 20 6 21 Roman Catholic (86%) 
Denmark 485  334 334 287 25 Lutheran (89%) 
Finland 615  357 60 60 22 Lutheran (88%) 
France 628  389 84 84 20.6 Roman Catholic (74%) 
Germany 547  346 346 45 15 Lutheran and Lutheran 
tradition (43%); Roman 
Catholic (36%) 
Greece 428  272 272 149 18 Greek Orthodox (96%) 
Ireland 421 366 53 53 20*   12.5  Roman Catholic (93%) 
Italy 581 425 127 51 20 Roman Catholic (83%) 
Luxembourg 268 322 20 0 15** 12 Roman Catholic (95%) 
Netherlands 610 351 51 51 17.5 Roman Catholic (36%) 
Dutch Reformed (19%) 
Reformed (Calvinist)(8%) 
Portugal 508 295 295 Na 17 5*** Roman Catholic (84%) 
Spain 434 291 85 85 16 Roman Catholic (95%) 
Sweden 576 406 406 229 25 Lutheran (85%) 
UK 666 666 43 43 17.5 Anglican (55%) Roman 
Catholic (9%) 
Presbyterian (3%) 
Other       
Japan 430 263 16 16 5 Buddhist 
Norway 683 539 Na Na 23 Lutheran (88%) 
Canada 70 28 28 0 7  
US - - 0 0 -  
* Except for heating gas oil  
** Except for unleaded petrol and heating gas oil, where it is 12 per cent  
*** 17 per cent for unleaded petrol, 5 per cent for diesel and industrial use   
Source: OECD, 1999, pp  46, 47  
Carpenter (1994)  
 
obligation is captured in the populist definition of a Calvinist, as someone 
who worries that someone somewhere may be enjoying themselves. 
The enthusiasm for implementing a range of green tax measures 
seems to diminish as you move from the cold Nordic North, dominated by 
Lutheran and Calvinist impulses, to the Catholic South. However, an 
examination of the magnitude of excise duties on fuel yields a somewhat 
more ambiguous picture. As regards unleaded petrol, Norway, the UK, 
France, Finland, Italy and Sweden are the leaders, in that order; as regards 
diesel, the UK, Norway, Italy and Sweden are the rank-ordered leaders. 
(Table 5.1) 
The antipathy to taxation so well discerned by Edmund Burke:  
 
To tax and to please, no more than to love and be wise, is not 
given to men.  
On American Taxation  
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leads in turn to strong public reactions against proposals which makes their 
introduction difficult or impossible politically.  
NO PERCEIVED NEED FOR TAX REFORM 
(and specifically, no perceived need for reduction in taxation on labour and 
the existence of the double dividend). 
 
In many of the countries that have embraced “green taxation” there has 
been an implicit need to reduce taxes on labour, and “green taxes” have 
been used as a justification for such reduction. Formal Green Tax 
Commissions have typically been used to address the opportunities, 
including any double dividend potentials (Schlegelmilch, 1997). The double 
dividend argument is simple and seductive; by imposing taxes on 
environmental bads, and recycling the revenue to reduce taxes on labour, 
under certain conditions, you can simultaneously improve environmental 
performance and economic performance. 
In the various partial equilibrium models using “real” data described in 
Barker and Johnstone (1999), it is found that imposing a carbon energy tax 
and recycling the revenues in the form of reduced payroll taxes will increase 
costs in the “carbon intensive” sectors – iron and steel, chemicals, non 
ferrous metals, and paper. All other sectors will experience cost reductions, 
and there will be an overall improvement in economic performance. This is 
consistent with findings by Nordhaus (1993) to the effect that when carbon 
tax is recycled as a lump sum to households, it results in a “significant net 
loss” of GDP. However, when tax revenues are used to reduce taxes 
judged to be burdensome, and imposing dead-weight losses, the annualised 
GDP rises.  
Conversely, using general equilibrium models, Bovenberg and de 
Mooij (1994) and Goulder (1995) conclude that the double dividend is a 
chimera. The dichotomy is explained by de Mooij (1999, p. 295) as follows:  
The incidence of environmental taxes is borne by labour incomes. 
Accordingly, labour taxes and environmental taxes distort labour supply 
decisions in a similar way. The direct labour tax is more efficient from a 
revenue raising perspective than the environmental tax because the latter 
tax also changes the composition of consumption over clean and polluting 
commodities, thereby eroding the tax base. Therefore, viewed from a non- 
environmental perspective, environmental taxes involve a higher excess 
burden. The presence of distortionary labour taxes thus makes it less 
attractive for the government to rely on environmental taxes for revenue 
raising purposes.  
Parry (1995) explains the difference in views by the use of different 
methodologies, namely, partial versus general equilibrium approaches. In 
particular, Parry argues that partial equilibrium models – used by the 
proponents of the double dividend – ignore the interactions between 
environmental taxes and pre-existing tax distortions. These so called “tax 
interdependence” effects are responsible for the failure of the double 
dividend in general equilibrium models. Barker and Johnstone (1999) 
counter as follows:   
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General equilibrium models assume constant returns to scale, perfect competition, in 
most if not all sectors, welfare maximisation by representative consumers and full 
employment.  
While the academic debate continues, it does seem as though the 
double dividend, whether it exists or not, has been a factor in inducing 
green tax policies in high unemployment countries in particular, including 
Germany and Italy. The UK is somewhat of an outlier in using double 
dividend type arguments in relation to the climate change levy, since the 
economy is approaching full employment. In Ireland when we had high 
unemployment, Des Geraghty of the Irish Congress of Trade Unions spoke 
sympathetically about double dividend opportunities, but full employment 
and fears about inflation have since pushed this theme off the agenda. 
PERCEPTION THAT ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTIVENESS IS 
NEGLIGIBLE OR AMBIGUOUS 
It is often argued that higher taxes or charges will have zero or negligible 
effects on environmental performance, or that to achieve environmental 
objectives, the taxes would have to be so high that they would be politically 
impossible (Boyle, 2000). The implication for policy being that some other 
policy instrument is to be preferred. There is in fact evidence to support the 
environmental effectiveness of some taxes and charges (EEA, 2000). 
Denmark 
For example, with regard to the saliency of CO2 taxes, there is evidence 
from Denmark, Sweden and Finland. The Danish energy/CO2 taxes have 
probably contributed to the fact that, since 1986, energy consumption has 
remained fairly constant, and emissions have decreased, while real GDP has 
risen by more than 50 per cent. (Enevoldsen, 1998; Danish EPA, 2000). It 
has been assessed that the energy policy package introduced in 1995 will 
reduce CO2 emissions by 3.8 per cent by 2005, of which 2 per cent will be 
realised as an impact of taxes (Danish Government, 1999). 
Sweden 
The introduction of the CO2 tax in 1991 was estimated to have led to a 
reduction in carbon dioxide emissions of 5 million tonnes by 1994, 
representing 9 per cent of total CO2 emissions (Swedish EPA, 1997). 
However, following reduction in this tax rate in 1992, CO2 emissions from 
industry were found to have increased by a quarter. In 1995, the tax rates 
were doubled for industry to counter this trend, and further increases are 
proposed for 2001.  
Finland 
A Finnish study showed that the CO2 tax is among the highest in Europe. 
The tax was introduced in 1990. Without the impact of energy taxation, 
emissions would have been 4 million tonnes, or 7 per cent, higher than the 
57 million tonnes recorded in 1998. (Prime Minister’s Office Publication 
Series, 2000).  
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Table 5.2: Environmental Responsiveness to Some Energy Taxes 
Absolute Taxes Response Sources Comment 
Tax on motor fuel Long term price  
elasticity of demand 
-0.65 to -1.0 
Goodwin, 1992; NEI, 
1991; Sterner, 1990; 
RCEP, 1994; 
 
But the UK has the highest excise 
taxes on unleaded petrol in the EU, 
but also the highest share of cars in 
land based transport. (European 
Commission, 2000) 
    
Diesel Long term price  
elasticity of demand  
-0.60 
NEI, 1991 In the UK, average fuel efficiency of 
articulated lorries over 33 tonnes 
increased between 1993 (when fuel 
escalator was introduced) and 1999 
(DETR, 1999). 
    
CO2 taxes,  
Denmark 
2 per cent reduction in 
emissions due to the tax 
Danish Government, 
1999. 
 
    
CO2 tax, Sweden Tax introduced in 1991 
estimated would reduce 
emissions by 9 per cent 
Swedish EPA, 1997  
    
CO2 tax, Finland Tax introduced in 1990 – 
7% reduction in  
emissions 
Finnish Economic 
Council, 2000 
 
Differential Taxes    
    
Sales tax on cars in 
Sweden 
Sales tax on most 
polluting cars increased in 
1993, and reduced for 
least polluting. Sales 
share of less polluting cars 
rose from 16 to 75 per 
cent  
Swedish EPA, 1997 Other policies were used as well. 
    
Danish Sulphur 
tax 
Rapid effect Danish Ministry of 
Taxation, 1998 
Positive impact also on technology 
    
Sulphur tax, UK Has turned almost the 
whole diesel market to 
very low sulphur fuel 
UK Government, 
1999 
 
Source: EEA, 2000, pp  44-50  
 
The availability of close substitutes is a crucial determinant of 
responsiveness. Thus, taxes on leaded petrol and high sulphur diesel evoke 
a substantial quantity reduction response, because there are close 
substitutes. Conversely, the UK has the highest transport taxes, but 
relatively low environmental effectiveness, because of the relatively poor 
access to collective transport, and its high costs. 
CONCERNS ABOUT IMPACTS ON COMPETITIVENESS AND (IN 
THE CASE OF CARBON TAX PROPOSALS) “CARBON 
LEAKAGE” 
Competitiveness has been identified by the OECD (1992, p. 237) as “the 
degree to which a country can under free and fair market conditions, 
produce goods and services which meet the test of international markets, 
while simultaneously maintaining and expanding the real incomes of its 
people over the longer term.”  
There is little evidence from past experience to support the view that 
capital investment flees jurisdictions that have stringent environmental 
standards. Apart from the United States, no other country has ever carried 
   ACCEPTABILITY AND IMPLEMENTATION PROBLEMS 87 
  
out a systematic collection of data on plant closures and consequential 
employment losses due to environmental measures (Sprenger, 1997). The 
US Department of Labour found that, in 1988, US employers attributed 
only 0.1 per cent of all layoffs to environment related causes, i.e. 99.9 per 
cent of job losses in that year were for other than environmental causes.  
There is some anecdotal evidence of firms moving to less 
environmentally stringent locations, but no systematic evidence. For 
example, the US General Accounting office suggests that a few furniture 
manufacturers may have moved their operations to Mexico in response to 
the State of California’s tightening of air quality standards for paint coatings 
and solvents (US GAO, 1991) 
Sprenger (1999) concludes that: 
Environmental costs are simply not a high enough share of overall costs 
in most sectors to outweigh other factors in investment decisions. Surveys 
of German and Japanese foreign direct investment do not even include 
environmental considerations as a reason to invest abroad. 
Furthermore, where environmental taxation is imposed, most schemes are 
designed – via exemption and otherwise – to ensure that a country’s 
competitive position is not damaged. In a global economy, this sets an 
effective ceiling to the rates and amounts that can be charged. Small open 
economies like Ireland, with a high dependence on exports, argue that they 
are especially vulnerable in this regard. There is a converse argument – the 
“Porter hypothesis” – which goes as follows (Porter, 1990, p. 647-8): 
Stringent standards for product performance, product safety, and 
environmental impact contribute to creating and upgrading competitive 
advantage. They pressure firms to upgrade quality, upgrade technology, and 
provide features in areas of important customer and social concern. 
Particularly beneficial are stringent regulations that anticipate standards that 
will spread internationally. These give a nation’s firms a head start in 
developing products and services that will be valued elsewhere. 
But he sets conditions which must be met if this innovation is to be 
achieved:  
If environmental standards are to foster the innovation offsets that 
arise from new technologies and approaches to production, they should 
also adhere to three principles: First, they must create the maximum 
opportunity for innovation, leaving the approach to innovation to the firm 
and not to the standard setting industry. Second, regulations should foster 
continuous improvements, rather than locking in any particular technology. 
Third, the regulatory process should leave as little room as possible for 
uncertainty at every stage. (Porter and van der Linde (1995, p.110) 
According to Jaffe et al. (1995), there is little empirical support from 
US experience for the Porter hypothesis, but US environmental regulations 
are generally economically inefficient. 
Brännlund et al. (1996) tested the Porter hypothesis on the Nordic 
pulp and paper industry, and found that an increase in the stringency of 
environmental regulations made the regulated industries worse off. 
However, they also found that the regulation was inefficient, so that the 
precondition for “delivery” of the Porter effect was not in place. In any 
event, Porter does not argue that each impacted sector will be better off; 
the innovation and payoff could take place elsewhere in the economy, and 
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the overall economic performance could be thereby enhanced, while 
individual sectors may suffer.  
While there is no evidence from past experience to support an 
argument that stringent environmental standards have damaged overall 
competitiveness, the future may not be like the past. There is no doubt that 
firms that are very energy intensive are likely to suffer if energy prices 
increase significantly as a result of energy taxes, if their competitor firms are 
not so taxed. And so smelting, the steel industry, oil refining, heavy 
chemicals, the pulp and paper sectors have tended to be the organising 
fulcrum for opposition to carbon taxation. 
POPULIST CULTURE AGAINST “CHARGES” AND ITS 
POLITICAL SALIENCY 
This idea that charging for services such as water and waste is “double 
taxation” seems to be a uniquely Irish phenomenon. But it has political 
“legs” as evidenced by the election of Joe Higgins as a member (TD) of the 
Irish parliament – for whom the abolition of charges was a central platform, 
– and the wave of criticism encountered by one political party – the 
Progressive Democrats (PD) – at the 1997 General Election campaign, 
when they proposed metering.  
Undoubtedly, the inequity of a fixed charge for water was a justifiable 
factor animating the sense of popular injury, but the fact that the 
Progressive Democrats suffered when the concept of metering was 
introduced at the last election may imply that metering is not a panacea. It 
is also clear from the reaction of focus groups35 that there is little public 
sympathy for any form of charging or environmental taxation, even when it 
is proposed that it be recycled in lower payroll taxes. Some focus group 
participants recalled the “Glorious 77” – meaning the election where 
Fianna Fail promised to abolish domestic rates (property tax), car tax and 
subsequently did so – as a compact between government and people to do 
away with all separate charging and pay for everything out of income tax. If 
environmental taxes were to be collected, then the predominant view of the 
public at the focus groups is that the funds should be used for 
environmental purposes, and not used to reduce income tax.  
In contrast to the tenor of this feedback from focus groups are the 
survey findings quoted by Scott and Eakins (2002) in this publication which 
seem to indicate that, if people can control how much they pay by changing 
their behaviour, e.g. by water metering, or charging per unit of waste 
delivered, they are much less emphatic in their opposition to charges. But 
we must keep in mind the “90 : 1” ratio from Brussels – 90 per cent of the 
complaints about water charges in Brussels come from 1 per cent of the 
population, namely the Irish. 
INHOSPITABLE POLITICAL GEOGRAPHY – THE SALIENCY OF 
PUBLIC ENVIRONMENTAL SENTIMENT AND “THE GREENS” 
The intensity of environmental commitment is a factor shaping enthusiasm 
for green taxation. Such commitment is expressed in some countries by a 
 
35 Louise Dunne unpublished Ph D  Thesis, University College Dublin  
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substantial parliamentary representation by Green Parties, but can also be 
internalised by and reflected in mainstream parties. The coming of Greens 
to government in France and Germany was certainly a crucial ingredient in 
the decisions in both those jurisdictions to adopt an environmental tax 
reform. In France it has not been implemented because of problems with 
the constitutionality of some proposed provisions. It is likely that if the 
Greens were part of new government in Ireland, environmental tax reform 
would feature on the programme for government.  
ABSENCE OF ECONOMICS AND ECONOMISTS IN PUBLIC 
ADMINISTRATION 
The peculiarly Irish phenomenon where there are no active economists – 
those who keep up with the literature and apply it in decision-making – in 
most relevant departments and agencies, including the Department of 
Finance, Environment and Local Government and the EPA is likely to 
inhibit action. It means that there is no one systematically bringing 
economic perspectives to bear, including the latest evidence. Of course, 
good economists are of their nature somewhat contrary – they’re always 
unhappy with the status quo, keep asking about alternatives, incentives and 
costs and benefits, and in general making a nuisance of themselves. If they 
are popular, they’re probably not doing their job, and this doesn’t commend 
them for membership of a club….. 
LACK OF “CHAMPIONS” 
There has to be a persistent and effective champion – and preferably more 
than one – at administrative, political or community and non-governmental 
levels. The introduction of emissions trading to address air pollution in 
Santiago, Chile, was driven by the enabling power and support of the 
Minster for Finance, the leadership of the industry association, and key 
elements in academic and administrative life. We have some enthusiasts in 
Ireland, but lack champions in the sense of being able to move from 
rhetorical and written support to effective action. (Convery and Katz, 
2002). 
EMPHASIS ON INVESTMENT AS THE MAIN POLICY 
INSTRUMENT 
The availability of generous matching Structural – including Cohesion –  
funds from the EU has placed a premium on “drawing down” the 
maximum feasible amount, while it is still there to be drawn down. This has 
two inhibiting effects on the potential for mobilising market forces to 
address environmental challenges. It has absorbed most of the 
administrative and political capacities in the benefiting jurisdictions, leaving 
little time for other pursuits, and the availability of investment funds has 
allowed capital expenditure to substitute for policies that would ration 
resource and environmental use. Specifically, it acts as a version of 
Gresham’s Law, where capital funds are used as a substitute for the 
mobilisation of the market as a means of bringing supply and demand into 
equilibrium. The process of securing and spending EU funds is also very 
demanding administratively, and compliance with the accounting and other 
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conditions imposes relatively high transactions costs. Thus, for example, in 
Spain, it is difficult to get a government to incur the political costs of 
charging farmers a price for irrigation water that reflects its full costs, when 
money is pouring into the Exchequer from the EU. Likewise in Ireland, 
why worry about charging households for water supply and waste water 
treatment when 75 per cent of the capital costs are being contributed by the 
Commission? 
LACK OF ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS RESEARCH 
To apply economic instruments to good effect – and to convince sceptics – 
you need information on the following: 
–  What precisely are the options, and what are their costs and 
benefits? The minutiae of design are as important as the 
concept, in shaping both environmental effectiveness and 
economic efficiency. What are the policy design choices? 
– What are likely to be the effects on international 
competitiveness, in terms of overall economy, sectors, regions 
? On the environment? That is, what are the price elasticities? 
– What are the transactions costs of design and implementation? 
– What are the institutional choices and implications? 
– What are the effects on the macro economy, on sectoral 
performance? 
– What are the equity effects? 
– What lessons can be learnt from international experience? 
These are all reasonable questions to which we in Ireland could have, 
but for the most part do not have, the answers. 
LACK OF MARKET SIGNAL ALTERNATIVES TO TAXES AND 
CHARGES36  
It is politically difficult in the US to introduce new or increased taxes at the 
Federal level. The defeat of George Bush Senior by Bill Clinton is 
attributed by many to the former’s introduction of increased taxes. 
President Clinton subsequently withdrew a proposal to impose a tax on 
gasoline in his first term, conscious perhaps that if enacted it might have a 
similarly malign effect on his electoral prospects. At the same time, it is 
difficult politically to change ambient or other standards supported by the 
EPA in compliance with its various statutes. It is this combination of tax 
antagonism, demanding standards to be met, and demonstrated 
ineffectualness of command and control, that has animated the 
development of emissions trading, with sharp reductions in lead in petrol 
and acid precursors (SOx) as the flagship examples (Sorrell and Skea, 1998). 
It was the complete political unfeasibility of introducing environmental 
charges on particulates in Santiago – the preferred policy choice of 
economists – that resulted in the adoption of emissions trading, with free 
allocation of quota (Convery and Katz, 2002). 
 
36 (But emissions trading, with free allocation, is emerging as a substitute for taxation and 
charges where the latter are politically impossible ) 
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It seems likely to me that – independent of the Kyoto process – 
emissions trading will emerge as a serious candidate policy instrument. 
Take the case of hazardous waste in Ireland. Waste arising was 
370,000 tonnes in 1998. 
Let us say that this waste was generated by 1,000 companies 
generating 370 tonnes each. They might be given quotas as follows, with a 
view to arriving at a total “envelope” of 250,000 tonnes ten years from 
now, holding average toxicity per tonne constant: 
 
 
 
Table 5.3: Hypothetical Example of Hazardous Waste Emission 
Trading Quotas in Ireland 
Year Total Hazardous  Waste arising 
(Tonnes) 
Per firm arising 
2001 370,000 370 
2005 300,000 300 
2011 250,000 250 
 
As shown in the hypothetical example in Table 5.3, the envelope reduces 
over time, to meet the waste reduction targets. But holders of a quota can 
trade; if it is very expensive for you to reduce, you maintain, or even 
increase, your volume of waste arising, and buy a permit for the extra 
amount you need above your quota from another firm for whom it is very 
inexpensive to reduce. 
If the price per tonne of annual waste reduction that emerged from 
such trades was, say, €10,000 per tonne, then any emitter who could reduce 
below this price would do so and sell “the surplus” permits on the market. 
Any firm for which it was more expensive would buy permits. The price 
signal would induce great innovation, and allow engineering and market 
ingenuity to flourish. The effect of emissions trading is to provide a price 
signal and to allocate reduction where it is least expensive and therefore 
least damaging to economic development.  Any new firm coming in, or 
existing firm expanding, would have to buy permits equivalent to their 
requirements.  
A key benefit of such a system is that it creates a strong incentive for 
generators of hazardous waste to come forward and declare their emissions, 
as this allows them to capture the value of the emission permits. 
INFLATIONARY PRESSURES, AND NEED FOR COMPLIANCE 
WITH THE MAASTRICHT CRITERIA 
The rise in inflation in Ireland, the Netherlands and Portugal has been a 
focus of concern. Domestically, it has implications for competitiveness in 
international markets, and is also linked to maintaining the social 
partnership model, whereby wage rises are agreed in nominal terms over a 
three year period; “unexpected” inflation will undermine compliance 
therewith by the unions. At EU level the European Commission has 
reprimanded Ireland for adopting fiscal policy that is perceived as too 
expansionary and too inflationary, and not consistent with the needs of 
European monetary policy. It can be argued that a tax induced rise in prices 
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is a “once off” and therefore not inflationary in the long run; but in politics 
the short run is important. And so inflation concerns inhibit consideration 
of environmental tax reform  
HIGH DEGREE OF FOSSIL FUEL DEPENDENCY 
Because the reality of environmental taxation is associated with taxes on 
energy in general, and carbon in particular, it can be hypothesised that 
countries that are more fossil fuel dependent than others are likely to be 
less enthusiastic about energy taxes. Ireland is relatively fossil fuel 
dependent, with no nuclear power, and a small hydro and other renewables 
base.  
THE ABSENCE OF AN INDUSTRY/BUSINESS LOBBY IN 
FAVOUR OF GREEN POLICIES GENERALLY, INCLUDING 
ENVIRONMENTAL TAXATION 
In the past (pre unification), North Rhine Westphalia had the worst 
pollution problems in Germany, and it was here that pollution abatement 
investment was highest. Nowadays, there are more companies 
manufacturing environmental technology in North Rhine Westphalia than 
in any other state.  Environmental technology now enjoys one of the fastest 
growing markets, with an annual turnover of about DM 26,000 million. 
Germany has an 18 per cent share of world trade (US 19 per cent, and 
Japan, 13 per cent). Its exacting national policies on environmental 
protection created an edge over its competitors. (Sprenger, 1999) 
Germany is set to establish a clear lead in the development and 
production of efficient energy systems, especially when the Residual Heat 
Ordinance comes into force. This applies to various types of plant (for 
example, heat transformers, heat exchangers, adsorbed heat pumps, 
absorption refrigeration, steam-powered engines, gas turbines, co-
generation systems), energy saving production facilities, energy supplies, 
and the engineering know how behind the rational use of energy (along 
with the relevant software). 
All of this activity has produced an active “eco-industries industry” 
lobby in Germany, which support “green taxation.” Such a lobby does not 
yet exist in Ireland. 
DEGREE OF (DIS)TRUST IN GOVERNMENT 
As it was expressed through the PETRAS focus groups, the public of all 
social classes and ages do not trust the government to “recycle”. 
Paradoxically, the evidence most frequently cited in this regard is the 
perceived imbalance between taxes generated from motorists, and what is 
spent on roads, where the motorists do not get back what they pay.  
CEILING ON POLITICALLY VIABLE INCREASES IN TAXES ON 
TRANSPORT FUELS LIKELY TO HAVE BEEN REACHED 
The tax revolt initiated by French farmers and fishermen, and then taken 
up by truckers, that started in September/October 2000 spread to other 
European countries. Eight countries – see list below – made significant 
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concessions on duties and other taxes payable. Current levels of tax are 
likely to be close to the maximum feasible politically. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5.4: Fiscal Reaction in Response to September/October 2000 Demonstrations 
Category GDP per capita  
(1999 ppp) 
% Green 
Vote 
Ranking in terms 
of magnitude of tax 
on unleaded petrol 
(1=highest) 
Ranking in terms 
of magnitude of tax 
on diesel  
(1=highest) 
No fiscal reaction     
Austria 24,646 - 12 11 
Denmark 26,770 2.7 4 7 
Greece 15,140 - 15 14 
Sweden 22,754 4.5 11 16 
Switzerland 28,672 5.0 10 5 
Minimal fiscal reaction     
Finland 22,775 7.7 8 12 
Germany 23,819 6.7 3 4 
Spain 18,215 - 14 13 
Significant fiscal reaction     
Belgium 24,845 14.3 9 10 
France 22,067 6.8 5 2 
Iceland 26,338 9.1 n.a. n.a. 
Ireland 25,404 2.8 13 9 
Italy 23,065 3.4 7 8 
Netherlands 25,923 7.3 2 3 
Norway 28,133 - 6 6 
UK 22,876 0.2 1 1 
No response     
Luxembourg 41,356 7.5 17 14 
Portugal 16,437 - 16 15 
GDP Source: National Accounts of OECD countries, Main aggregates, Volume 1  
Vote Source: http://www.agora.stm.it/elections
 
 A number of variables have been identified as possible explanations for 
the likelihood that environmental taxation will be mobilised as a substantial 
policy instrument. These include: governments don’t need the money; lack 
of leadership by the Department Finance and Treasury; antagonistic 
popular culture reflected in religious ethos; no perceived need for tax 
reform, and specifically, no perceived need for reduction in taxation on 
labour and the existence of the double dividend; perception that 
environmental effectiveness is negligible or ambiguous; concerns about 
impacts on competitiveness and (in the case of carbon tax proposals) 
“Carbon Leakage”; populist culture against “charges” and its political 
saliency; inhospitable political geography – the saliency of public 
environmental sentiment and “the Greens”; absence of economics and 
economists in public administration; lack of  “champions”; emphasis on 
investment as the main policy instrument; lack of environmental economics 
research; lack of market signal alternatives to taxes and charges; inflationary 
pressures, and need for compliance with the Maastricht criteria; high degree 
of fossil fuel dependency; absence of an industry/business lobby in favour 
of green policies generally, including environmental taxation; degree of 
5.2 
Summary and 
Conclusions 
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(dis)trust in government; and finally, ceiling on politically viable increases in 
taxes on transport fuels likely to have been reached.  
 
Some of these are merely plausible hypotheses, for which limited or 
no evidence was adduced, while in other cases, there is some research to 
support the case made. The logic of being inclusive is that it provides a 
template on which further research can be undertaken, validating or 
otherwise the propositions made, and then deleting or adding variables as 
the evidence calls for.  
 
Table 5.5: Current Situation and Prospects Relating to Hypothesised Indicators Affecting 
the Mobilisation of Markets to Protect the Environment, Ireland, 2001 
 Hypothesised Indicator Current 
situation 
2001 
Prospects 
2002-2005 
Author’s Comment 
 
Governments don’t need the money 
 
0 
 
3 
 
As the economy slows down, the 
government may find it expedient to 
identify new sources of Exchequer funding. 
Neutral or Antagonistic Role of 
Department Finance and Treasury. 
0 ? Political engagement in a future 
government, e.g. by the Greens could 
change things. 
Need for tax reform, and specifically, 
perceived need for reduction in 
taxation on labour. 
0 7 Tax reform will come back on the agenda if 
Exchequer revenues fall below 
expectations. 
Perception of Environmental  
effectiveness is positive but can be 
made to appear ambiguous. 
3 5 Those in the policy system today agree 
that market based policies could improve 
environmental performance. 
Populist culture against “charges” and 
its political saliency. 
0 0 No sign of real change. The PR system will 
ensure that there is a political voice there 
against “double taxation”. 
Political Geography – the saliency of 
public environmental sentiment and 
“the Greens”. 
0 2 Likely to depend on whether the arithmetic 
after the next election favours government 
participation by the Greens. 
Absence of Economics and 
Economists in public administration. 
0 3 Recent hiring of an environmental 
economist to support the climate change 
strategy. 
Lack of effective “Champions”. 0 ? Could emerge. 
Emphasis on Investment as the main 
policy instrument. 
0 5 As Structural and Cohesion Funds 
diminish in absolute amounts, there is 
l kely to be more attention devoted to other 
approaches to public policy. 
Lack of Environmental Economics 
Research. 
1 5 The EPA, the Irish Energy Centre, and 
perhaps others will start funding serious 
research. 
Emissions Trading – with free 
allocation – substitutes for taxation and 
charges where the latter is politically 
impossible.  
1 3 If Kyoto excluding the US is agreed, then 
emissions trading is likely to emerge as an 
important policy instrument. 
Inflationary pressures, and need for 
compliance with the Maastricht criteria. 
0 5 A slowing economy is likely to abate the 
inflationary pressures. 
Degree of fossil fuel dependency. 2 4 Nuclear option will remain moribund, but 
wind power will expand. 
The Emergence of an 
industry/business lobby in favour of 
green policies generally, including 
environmental taxation.  
0 1 Wind lobby may begin to make its views 
heard. 
Degree of (dis)trust in government. 
 
0 0 Nothing likely to reduce this in the medium 
term. 
Ceiling on Politically viable increases 
in  Taxes on Transport Fuels likely to 
have been reached.  
0 2 Some more action possible, but only in the 
context of a wider tax reform. 
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Weightings: 0 = no positive contribution to introduction of market-based instruments, 
   10 = outstanding contribution  
 
 
 
It also provides a framework for examining whether a particular 
jurisdiction is likely to embrace environmental taxation in the future. To 
illustrate this potential, the situation and prospects in Ireland are 
summarised in Table 5.5, where 0 = no positive contribution to 
introduction of market based instruments; 10 = outstanding contribution to 
introduction of such instruments in environmental policy. These weightings 
are of course highly subjective, but in the “Comment” column I provide a 
justification for my determination. 
It can be seen in Table 5.5 that, in my judgement, the preponderance 
of the factors in Ireland at present (2001) is acting to inhibit the 
mobilisation of market forces in support of environmental policy. However, 
there are prospects for some (modest) improvement in this regard over the 
2002-2005 period.  
There is an implication in this analysis for those who would like to 
actively promote the use of market based instruments generally, and 
environmental taxation in particular. Unless some of the contextual 
conditions become favourable, it is likely to be a waste of time and other 
resources to allocate much effort to achieve something that is not in effect 
feasible. Conversely, when the pre-conditions do move in a favourable 
direction, then such effort is likely to yield dividends. 
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